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Article 
United States Competition Policy in 
Crisis: 1890–1955 
Herbert Hovenkamp† 
  INTRODUCTION:   
  HISTORICAL EXPLANATION AND THE MARGINALIST 
REVOLUTION   
The history of legal policy toward the economy in the United 
States has emphasized interest group clashes that led to regula-
tory legislation.1 This is also true of the history of competition 
policy.2 Many historians see regulatory history as little more than 
a political process in which well-organized, dominant interest 
groups obtain political advantage and protect their particular in-
dustry from competition, typically at the expense of consumers.3 
 
†  Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor, University of Iowa College of Law. 
Thanks to Christina Bohannan for commenting on a draft. Copyright © 2009 
by Herbert Hovenkamp. 
 1. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULA-
TION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 83–84 (1996); THE REGULATED ECONO-
MY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY 12–22 (Claudia Goldin & 
Gary D. Libecap eds., 1994); Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulation History as Politics 
or Markets, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 549, 549 (1995) (reviewing THE REGULATED 
ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra). 
 2. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRIN-
CIPLE AND EXECUTION, 40–41 (2005); Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Origins of Anti-
trust: An Interest-Group Perspective, 5 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 73, 74 (1985); Tho-
mas W. Hazlett, The Legislative History of the Sherman Act Re-Examined, 30 
ECON. INQUIRY 263, 267 (1992); Fred S. McChesney, Be True to Your School: Chi-
cago’s Contradictory Views of Antitrust and Regulation, in THE CAUSES AND CON-
SEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC-CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 323, 331 (Fred S. 
McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995) (noting that interest group pres-
sures explain much of the Sherman Antitrust Act); George J. Stigler, The Origin 
of the Sherman Act, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1985).  
 3. See, e.g., GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION: 1877–1916, at 3 
(1965); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & 
ECON. 211, 212 (1976) (developing a theoretical model to explain the “producer 
protection” view); Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regula-
tion, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807, 809–21 (1975) (presenting a model of social costs of 
monopoly and monopoly-inducing regulation). 
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But clearly there must be more to this story. Interest group 
politics cannot explain all aspects of our regulatory past. For ex-
ample, in almost every state, electricity and natural gas histori-
cally have been delivered to retail customers by monopoly fran-
chises at regulated prices.4 By contrast, in every state, groceries, 
shoes, and lumber were sold in competitive markets with no reg-
ulation of price, output, or service territory, except for a few brief 
periods of extremist flirtation.5 It would be silly to conclude that 
these results were obtained uniformly in so many markets simply 
because the interest groups backing the electricity and natural 
gas industries were better organized than were the purveyors of 
groceries, shoes, or lumber. In fact, policymaking in these situa-
tions was heavily driven by theory.6 At the same time, interest 
group pressures in a complex democracy cannot be ignored, par-
ticularly in a political regime such as that of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, when fundamental changes in 
technology and corporate structure were causing many displace-
ments of older small businesses with newer, larger ones.7 During 
this period the large business firm that operates in many states 
came into existence. Productive efficiencies that resulted from 
industrialization led to rapid but volatile economic growth, ex-
treme speculation, and then the Great Depression and the 
eventual rise of the regulatory state.8  
This Article argues that government policy toward compe-
tition is not inevitably driven by special interests but rather is 
a complex product of theory and interest group pressure. When 
economic theory is robust and widely held, as was the competi-
tion model of the classical political economists, then the theory 
serves to centralize political power and to squelch special-
interest dissenters. In these cases, theory and politics converge. 
However, if the theory is controversial, if it contains significant 
gaps, or if many features of it are poorly understood, then in-
terest group pressures become more prominent and tend to de-
termine government policy. This perspective on regulation ap-
preciates the merits of economic ideas more than does much of 
the writing in both economic history and public choice theory. 
 
 4. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business 
Firm: 1880–1960, at 4 (Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 08-40, 
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1268328. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
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This model applies today as much as in our past. For exam-
ple, in the law of intellectual property we lack a robust consensus 
on such fundamental questions as what the duration or scope of 
an intellectual property right should be, or what the relationship 
is between patent and copyright protection and incentives to in-
novate.9 The result is that the Patent and Copyright Acts are a 
mélange of special interest provisions that gives an observer little 
confidence that the incentive to innovate is what the Acts are all 
about.10 In contrast, by the 1970s the economic models for compe-
tition produced broad, although hardly unanimous, consensus 
among neoclassical economists.11 This is reflected in a set of mod-
ern antitrust provisions that is relatively simple and interest-
group neutral at its core.12 
This thesis can help explain the unprecedented level of fum-
bling, experimentation, and interest group activity that characte-
rized United States competition policy during the marginalist 
revolution in economics, which began in the late nineteenth cen-
tury and lasted for decades. Part I of this Article provides an 
overview of the marginalist revolution that displaced the classical 
understanding of industrial economics in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Next, Part II explores Progressive Era 
social-control theories as they were applied in industrial econom-
ics, the vexing problem of fixed costs, which were seen as an in-
creasingly common attribute of industry but which did not fit 
well into the prevailing models of competition, and the impact of 
these developments on competition policy. Part III examines the 
imperfect resolution of the fixed-costs problem provided by the 
 
 9. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual 
Property Law, 1900–2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2189, 2189 (2000) (noting the common 
criticism that intellectual property law is “out-of-date, overwhelmed by the new 
technology of the day, and in need of a radical makeover”). 
 10. See id. at 2233 (arguing that a lack of legislative consistency leads to liti-
gation over patent issues that slows innovation); see also Christina Bohannan, 
Reclaiming Copyright, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 567, 568 (2006) (“As a result 
of special-interest capture, the Copyright Act confers overly broad rights to copy-
right owners at the expense of the public interest in having access to creative 
works.”); Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Er-
rands into the Wilderness, 50 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 
1), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1377382 
(“[P]atent and copyright law have lost their focus on facilitating the type and 
amount of innovation needed to benefit consumers, and turned toward the pro-
tection of rights holders.”). 
 11. See 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶¶ 100–01 (3d ed. 2006) (noting that current antitrust laws support the gener-
al goal of competition of performance). 
 12. Id. 
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imperfect competition and monopolistic competition models in the 
1930s. Part IV looks at how these models affected competition 
policy, and particularly, how they encouraged much greater anti-
trust intervention. Part V then documents the rise of structural-
ism in postwar competition theory, particularly the structure-
conduct-performance (S-C-P) paradigm, which was one of the 
most important competition models in the history of economic 
policy, but is today largely discredited. Part VI comments on the 
decline of the structural paradigm and the rise of the Chicago 
School, which deemphasized both the importance of structure 
and the opportunities for anticompetitive behavior.  
I.  THE MARGINALIST REVOLUTION   
Marginalism substituted the forward-looking concepts of 
marginal utility, marginal revenue, and marginal cost in place of 
the historical averages used by classical political economists to 
explain economic behavior.13 This neoclassical revolution inter-
rupted a period of relatively stable and largely benign thinking 
about competition and revolutionized industrial economics in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.14 While the classic-
ists were somewhat preoccupied with monopoly in land, in manu-
facturing they tended to see either competition or monopoly, and 
monopoly was regarded as exceptional.15 The marginalist model 
threatened that vision by developing mathematical models that 
divided markets into degrees of competitiveness.16 This further 
led to a search for the specifications of a perfectly competitive 
market and the developing intuition that such markets were in 
fact quite rare. 
A. THE LEGACY OF CLASSICISM AND COURNOT 
Classical political economy had the distinct advantage of not 
being technical. Expectations for mathematical precision were 
not particularly high. If they were writing today, the classical po-
 
 13. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 2.  
 14. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Neoclassicism and the Separation of Ownership 
and Control, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 4), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1315003; Herbert Ho-
venkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Corporate Finance: 1880–1965, at 1 (Un-
iv. of Iowa Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 08-29, 2008), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1141291.  
 15. See generally MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT chs. 8–
11, 15 (4th ed. 1985) (chronicling the transition from neoclassicism to the mar-
ginal revolution). 
 16. See id.  
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litical economists would be regarded as public intellectuals writ-
ing about policy. “Competition” most typically referred to the ri-
valry that existed among two or more businesspersons.17 For ex-
ample, Adam Smith distinguished between competition and 
collusion and realized that rivals must be sufficiently numerous 
so as to make collusion unlikely.18 He knew that competition re-
quired actors who were knowledgeable about market conditions 
and had the freedom to act upon this knowledge, and required 
that resources be mobile.19 But Smith and other classicists had at 
best a vaguely formulated concept of the relationship between 
competitive prices and cost. Further, the English classicists had 
very little conception of “degrees” of competition. Markets were 
either competitive or else they were monopolized.20 Augustin 
Cournot, writing in France in the 1830s and largely ignored for a 
half century, attempted to quantify the relationship between 
marginal production and costs, and related the number of firms 
in a market to the market price.21 But only with the rise of mar-
ginalism did Cournot’s work come into vogue in England and lat-
er in the United States.22 
With the exception of Cournot, the classicists rarely used 
mathematics. Both W. Stanley Jevons and Léon Walras began to 
use some math in the 1870s, and Jevons acknowledged Cournot’s 
influence.23 Alfred Marshall also acknowledged Cournot in his 
 
 17. See George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 
J. POL. ECON. 1, 1 (1957) (citing ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND 
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 56–57 (Edward Cannan ed., Modern Li-
brary 1937) (1776)). 
 18. See id. at 2 (noting Smith’s observations on the influence of the num-
ber of economic rivals in competition). 
 19. See id. (listing Smith’s five conditions of competition).  
 20. See id. at 5 (“[T]he most striking deficiency of the classical economists 
was their failure to work out the theory of the effects of competition on the distri-
bution of income.”). 
 21. See Irving Fisher, Introduction to AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RECHERCHES 
SUR LES PRINCIPES MATHÉMATIQUES DE LA THÉORIE DES RICHESSES [RESEARCHES 
INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH] ix, ix–xii (Na-
thaniel T. Bacon trans., Augustus M. Kelley 1960) (1838) (discussing the life and 
work of Cournot). 
 22. See generally Martik Shubik, Cournot, Antoine Augustin, in 1 THE NEW 
PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 708, 708–12 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 
1987). 
 23. See, e.g., W. STANLEY JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 3, 
85 n.1 (5th ed., Augustus M. Kelley 1965) (1871) (discussing the mathematical 
character of economics and reflecting on Cournot’s work); LÉON WALRAS, ELE-
MENTS OF PURE ECONOMICS 83–91 (William Jaffé trans., George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd. 1954) (1874) (developing a mathematical theory for the market and competi-
tion). 
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1890 Principles of Economics.24 While Cournot did not use the 
term “marginal cost,” his mathematical formulations for competi-
tion used a term defined as the rate of increase in per-unit costs, 
which is the same thing.25 Cournot also showed that the intersec-
tion of a declining demand curve and an increasing marginal cost 
curve determined how much a competitive firm would produce 
and, indirectly, the price it would charge.26 He then theorized 
that if each firm in a market with relatively few sellers computed 
this profit-maximizing rate of output on the assumption that ri-
vals would hold their outputs constant, the market would reach 
an equilibrium in which output was lower than the competitive 
level, but not so low as the single firm monopoly level.27 This 
highly elegant mathematical model—the first theory of oligopo-
ly—was responsible for much of the marginalist theorizing about 
competition early in the twentieth century. 
Cournot’s model was widely regarded as excessively simplis-
tic, for a number of reasons. First, the theory that each firm 
would set its own output on the assumption that other firms 
would hold their output constant was counterintuitive.28 In addi-
tion, Cournot assumed a perfectly fungible product—that is, that 
the output of different producers was so nearly identical that con-
sumers were indifferent to everything except price.29 He also as-
sumed that firms were indifferent to the potential for market en-
try by other firms, and he paid almost no attention to the 
presence of fixed as opposed to variable costs.30 In sum, while 
 
 24. See ALFRED MARSHALL, 2 PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 35, 36 (8th ed. 
MacMillan & Co. 1925) (1890) (discussing how Cournot influenced his works). 
 25. Irving Fisher, Cournot and Mathematical Economics, 12 Q.J. ECON. 119, 
127 (1898). 
 26. See id. (crediting Cournot for developing the supply and demand curves).  
 27. See, e.g., id. at 128 (reviewing Cournot’s analysis of the effect of copper 
and zinc monopolies on the price of brass). 
 28. The most influential, and very hostile, critique came from Joseph Ber-
trand, who illustrated that if one adopted price instead of output as the relative 
variable, the firms in Cournot’s model would set the competitive price for any 
number of firms greater than one. See Joseph Bertrand, Théorie Mathématique de 
la Richesse Sociale, 67 J. DES SAVANTS 499, 499–508 (1883). For a good historical 
discussion, see Jean Magnan de Bornier, The “Cournot-Bertrand Debate”: A His-
torical Perspective, 24 HIST. POL. ECON. 623, 623–55 (1992). 
 29. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 917, 919–20 (2003) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2001)) 
(examining the assumptions made in the Cournot model). 
 30. See id. at 920 (“Although factors like high fixed costs, scale economies, 
and product differentiation are certainly complications, these factors are all struc-
tural.”). 
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Cournot’s theory supplied the core of marginalist competition 
analysis, many details had to be worked out. 
Nevertheless, Cournot’s overly simplistic assumptions ac-
tually account for his theory’s durability, as well as the centrality 
of his model to the marginalists’ debate over competition policy. 
Much of that debate concerned what occurs when you relax one 
or more of Cournot’s simple assumptions, by considering such 
things as high fixed costs, product differentiation, or entry bar-
riers. 
B. NEOCLASSICISM AND THE INTRODUCTION OF MARGINALISM 
Marginalism led to a number of puzzles that had to be 
worked out before the classical theory of competitive equilibrium 
could be reformulated to accommodate marginalist assumptions. 
An economic equilibrium is a steady state such that no market 
participant has an incentive to change unless some effect from 
outside the market occurs.31 Unless constrained, an economy that 
is not in equilibrium tends to move toward one, while an economy 
in equilibrium tends to stay there.32 The classical political econ-
omists generally gave little thought to the conditions necessary 
for equilibrium. The notable exception was David Ricardo, who 
believed that the economy always headed toward a steady state 
in which labor and marginal land earned minimum sustainable 
incomes, while superior land permanently captured higher prof-
its, or rents.33 Even the great Cambridge University economist 
Alfred Marshall, whose Principles of Economics was both margi-
nalist and much more entrepreneurial than Ricardo’s work, fo-
cused on the manufacturing economy’s two simplest equilibria—
perfect competition and monopoly—and gave very little thought 
to anything in between.34 
As Joseph Schumpeter observed in the 1930s, the purpose of 
equilibrium analysis in economics is to allow policymakers to 
 
 31. See, e.g., JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 
92–94 (1938) (discussing competitive equilibrium). 
 32. See, e.g., id. 
 33. See DAVID RICARDO, AN ESSAY ON THE INFLUENCE OF A LOW PRICE OF 
CORN ON THE PROFITS OF STOCK (1815), reprinted in 4 THE WORKS AND CORRES-
PONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO 4–6 (Piero Sraffa ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1962) (discussing the relationship between the value of land and its fertility). See 
generally MICHIO MORISHIMA, RICARDO’S ECONOMICS: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
THEORY OF DISTRIBUTION AND GROWTH 5–8 (1989); H. Barkai, Ricardo’s Static 
Equilibrium, 32 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 15, 15–31 (1965) (analyzing the Ricardian 
theoretical framework). 
 34. See generally MARSHALL, supra note 24, at 36–38. 
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analyze the causes of “chronic disequilibria.”35 But if this is so, 
Schumpeter concluded, the geometry of marginalism, with its 
curves that shift depending on one’s assumptions, cannot remain 
an academic curiosity.36 Problematically, however, in the vast 
range between perfect competition and absolute monopoly lies 
much unknown territory. 
 [A]s soon as we realize the implications of imperfect competition all 
presumption vanishes for some of those effects to emerge which we 
used to attribute to the normal working of an economic society which 
in common parlance would still be called “competitive.” Our theorems 
about maximum satisfaction or maximum national dividend cease to 
hold true and the list of cases in which collective political action can 
increase both of them becomes so extended as to make these cases the 
rule rather than more or less curious exceptions.37 
The post-Marshall development of neoclassical economics, 
with its mathematics of incentives at the margin, permitted an 
infinite array of alternatives to competition and monopoly. In 
particular, the development of imperfect competition and oligopo-
ly theory led to the realization that in many markets at least one 
equilibrium existed in which prices were significantly above the 
competitive level, plants had too much unused capacity, and 
product differentiation was significant. In her pathbreaking early 
1930s neoclassical study of price theory, The Economics of Imper-
fect Competition, Marshall’s student Joan Robinson noted that 
while traditionally economists had treated competition as the 
norm and monopoly as a special case, marginalist analysis 
showed that “it is more proper to set out the analysis of monopo-
ly, treating perfect competition as a special case.”38 The develop-
ing concept of entry barriers, or prices that might not be discip-
lined by new competition, made the policy implications of these 
conclusions even more ominous. Further, in the earlier models, 
particularly those of Marshall and Robinson, profits tended to 
flow toward capital at the expense of labor—a point that is made 
repeatedly in Progressive Era policy literature.39 In sum, for 
 
 35. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect Competition, 
42 J. POL. ECON. 249, 256 (1934). 
 36. See id. (“Certain kinds of shifts are amenable to rule or law and can be 
handled with relative ease just as movements along a curve, and this means 
that we must build the economic cycle into our general theory.”). 
 37. Id. at 250–51. 
 38. ROBINSON, supra note 31, at 307.  
 39. See, e.g., J. H. Hollander, Political Economy and the Labor Question, 
176 N. AM. REV. 563, 565–66 (1903) (noting that “[c]apital took on a new im-
portance” for the English political economists developing the wage fund 
theory). But see Francis A. Walker, The Doctrine of Rent, and the Residual 
Claimant Theory of Wages, 5 Q.J. ECON. 417, 420–22 (1891) (refuting the ar-
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quite some time, marginalism brought to an end the notion that 
pure competition or something close to it was the norm, with mo-
nopoly as an occasional exception. Market imperfections seemed 
to exist everywhere. 
The new economics also began to focus on the structure of 
business organizations. Perhaps by coincidence, the rise of mar-
ginalist economic theory occurred simultaneously with the rise of 
the large business enterprise. When Adam Smith surveyed the 
economic landscape he saw a world of farmers, blacksmiths, cob-
blers, and bakers, mainly small enterprises with low initial in-
vestment, significant mobility, and little product differentiation 
other than a particular tradesman’s reputation for quality.40 But 
writing in the late 1920s and early 1930s, Joan Robinson and 
Edward Chamberlin saw an economic world dominated much 
more prominently by large firms with significant fixed-cost in-
vestments in specialized equipment, differentiated products, and 
excess capacity.41 
The emergent theory of the firm contained two strands. First 
was a marginalist strand, which found numerous imperfections 
until the technical details of the neoclassical model of industrial 
organization were worked out.42 Second was a Darwinian “insti-
tutionalist” strand, which was much more empirical, but was 
equally prone to view the large business firm with suspicion. Al-
though it was ignored for decades, Ronald Coase’s famous article, 
The Nature of the Firm, was eventually interpreted as merging 
these two strands by combining empirical study with a theory of 
relative costs of intra-firm versus market procurement.43 
In the marginalist conception of a perfectly competitive econ-
omy, prices are driven to marginal cost and the industry as a 
whole produces at the most efficient rate possible. While these 
 
gument of the inverse relationship between capital and labor with respect to 
the “residual” theory of wages).  
 40. See generally SMITH, supra note 17, at 1–10. 
 41. See infra note 206 and accompanying text. See generally EDWARD 
CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 1–16 (3d ed. 1939); 
ROBINSON, supra note 31, at 92–94.  
 42. See Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 3 (“The marginalist crisis in compe-
tition policy did not find a satisfactory solution until the middle of the twen-
tieth century. Because markets are populated by firms, the principal actors in 
this crisis were business corporations. Economists in the first half of the twen-
tieth century probed the firm’s nature, structure, motives and extent of opera-
tions at an unprecedented level.”).  
 43. For more information on Coase’s work, which developed an economic 
definition of a firm and a theory of moving equilibrium, see R. H. Coase, The 
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386, 404–05 (1937). 
  
320 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [94:311 
 
conclusions largely tracked the much less technical formulations 
of “pure” competition in classical political economy,44 there was 
one important difference. The classicists generally believed that 
competition was the norm except when government intervened.45 
By contrast, the initial impact of marginalist analysis was the be-
lief that competition was exceptional.46 Fixed costs and scale 
economies dictated that firms could not price at the competitive 
level. Under the economic theories of the late nineteenth and ear-
ly twentieth centuries, such firms would be driven to overproduc-
tion and “ruinous competition” as prices would be forced so low 
that they could not cover a firm’s fixed-cost investments.47 In the 
1930s, however, new models that incorporated product differen-
tiation largely solved the ruinous competition problem.48 Product 
differentiation served to limit firms’ competition with one another 
even when they were in the same general market. But competi-
tion in product-differentiated markets was hardly perfect either: 
instead of overproduction, firms in such markets tended to have 
excess capacity and to invest too much in product design and ad-
vertising.49 Oligopoly theory exacerbated the problem by theoriz-
ing even poorer performance when the number of firms was small 
and entry barriers were high.50 
C. CONSEQUENCES OF MARGINALISM FOR ANTITRUST POLICY 
The policy consequences of these developments in economic 
theory were significant. For many economists during the early 
part of the century, high fixed costs dictated that almost any 
 
 44. The conclusions mainly tracked the works of Adam Smith, Thomas Mal-
thus, David Ricardo, Naussau Senior, and John Stuart Mill. 
 45. See, e.g., BLAUG, supra note 15, at 594 (examining Adam Smith’s 
theory on competition).  
 46. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 3 (“The rise of marginalist eco-
nomics . . . led to . . . the developing intuition that [perfectly competitive] mar-
kets were quite rare.”). 
 47. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 311 (discussing Arthur Twin-
ing Hadley’s theory of ruinous competition). 
 48. Cf. Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 48 (“The switch from industrial theo-
ries involving fixed costs and fungible products to those based on product dif-
ferentiation very largely explains the abrupt switch in antitrust policy that 
occurred during the Roosevelt Administration.”). 
 49. Cf. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836–1937, 
at 338 (1991) (discussing similar fears related to vertical integration in the 
1930s). 
 50. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 49 (“[E]conomists feared the 
move from monopolistic competition, where new entry was generally pre-
sumed to be easy, to oligopoly, which had all the evils of excessive product dif-
ferentiation but high entry barriers and higher prices as well.”). 
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amount of antitrust regulation was excessive.51 They believed 
that dominant firms and cooperation were inherent features of 
the industrial landscape.52 Any attempt by government to sup-
press them would result in higher costs at best, or complete loss 
of market stability at worst.53 This economic model was coming 
into vogue in 1890, when the Sherman Act was passed, and helps 
explain why so many economists opposed antitrust legislation.54 
At the opposite extreme, the product differentiation models of the 
1930s were seen as leading to underproduction, excess capacity, 
and too much investment in product differentiation and advertis-
ing.55 High entry barriers and oligopoly concentration greatly ex-
acerbated the problem.56 In such a regime, antitrust readily 
found an important place. 
In 1940, Columbia University economist John Maurice 
Clark, the most pragmatic theoretician of mid-century competi-
tion policy, thrust a consensus-forming paper into this mix—his 
essay on “workable competition.”57 Clark’s paper, which was to 
have a powerful influence on antitrust policy, argued that al-
though the observed imperfections were real, their impact had 
been exaggerated.58 In reality, government policymakers could 
identify and enforce a degree of competition that was functionally 
adequate, particularly when compared with the available regula-
tory alternatives.59  
The “workable competition” model served to make the case 
for antitrust as the principal regulator of competition in the 
 
 51. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, at 309 (1991) (“If forced to compete, 
firms in these industries would naturally be driven to ruin. The principal cause of 
this ‘ruinous competition’ was the presence of high fixed costs.”). 
 52. See id. at 310 (“John Bates Clark argued in 1887 that certain indus-
tries were so prone to overproduction that the firms in them must either col-
lude or face ‘widespread ruin.’”). 
 53. Id. at 309.  
 54. Id.  
 55. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 56. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, at 338 (noting that firms in oligopoly 
markets engaged in “extreme product differentiation and carried abundant 
excess capacity”).  
 57. See J.M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. 
ECON. REV. 241, 241–46 (1940). Clark was at the University of Chicago from 1915 
to 1926, and at Columbia from 1926 until his retirement in 1957. For general in-
formation on Clark, see LAURENCE SHUTE, JOHN MAURICE CLARK: A SOCIAL 
ECONOMICS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1997).  
 58. Clark, supra note 57, at 243. 
 59. See id. at 256 (“[O]ne may hope that government need not assume the 
burden of doing something about every departure from the model of perfect 
competition.”). 
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United States, and to preserve a relatively small domain for gov-
ernment agency command-and-control regulation. Important de-
tails had to be resolved, however, and a significant debate ensued 
in the 1950s between Harvard “structuralism” and a more beha-
viorist alternative developed mainly at the University of Chica-
go.60 
II.  PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL CONTROL AND THE PROBLEM 
OF FIXED COSTS   
Emergent social science in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries was heavily concerned with “social control.” 
The idea was that society, acting through both public and private 
orderings, tended to normalize and limit the excesses of individu-
al behavior.61 The fundamental idea of social control, sociologist 
Edward Alsworth Ross wrote in his pathbreaking 1901 book of 
that title, was that individual and social interests were funda-
mentally in conflict.62 This observation itself was a sharp break 
with a classical past that had tended to see individual desires, 
though hedonistic, as melding together to form the social interest. 
This accounted for the classical theory of markets, where the sel-
fish desires of individuals united for the common good via volun-
tary exchange.63 
For marginalists such as Ross, social control was not limited 
to absolute coercion but rather took the form of any set of social 
or government incentives that influenced individuals to do some-
thing that they might not do if unconstrained.64 Indeed, one of 
the most important policy contributions of marginalism outside of 
price theory was its notion that coercion is always a matter of de-
gree, and that utility-maximizing actors equate alternative 
sources of pain or pleasure just as they equate the utilities of de-
sirable goods. This theme came to dominate social science 
through the legal realists, including the writings of such early 
realists as Robert Hale, who studied the manifold ways that the 
 
 60. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 31–38 (comparing and 
contrasting the Harvard School with the Chicago School). 
 61. See generally EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS, SOCIAL CONTROL 1–6 (MacMil-
lan, 1926) (1901). 
 62. See id. at 441–42 (noting the clash between the “Strong Man” and socie-
ty).  
 63. Cf. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 273 (noting Francis Walker’s defini-
tion of competition as “the operation of individual self-interest” where “each 
man is acting for himself solely”).  
 64. See, e.g, id. at 429 (“The control of the person’s will by precept or example 
is, therefore, preferable to the control of it by the employment of sanctions.”). 
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legal system operated to coerce behavior and transfer wealth 
without the use of absolute force.65 Further, Hale argued, this 
had always been the case, even under professed systems of lais-
sez faire that regarded the state as uninvolved with economic 
life.66 
The ideological origins of the social control idea and the rea-
sons for its great popularity are somewhat ambiguous. Clearly, 
its proponents doubted the long-held faith in American exception-
alism, with its belief that America was different and that God 
would always keep it and its citizens on the right course.67 Social 
control was about the need for society and not merely religion to 
control deviant social behavior. “Deviance” was typically defined 
from the perspective of the middle and upper middle class aca-
demics who became America’s first social scientists. Control de-
vices were seen as necessary to restrain the immorality and un-
productive behavior of the poor, uneducated, and minority races. 
Importantly, however, they were also needed to contain the prof-
ligacy of the super-rich and rapacious.68 
In the mid-twenties John Maurice Clark wrote a lengthy 
book on social control of business behavior.69 That book set the 
stage for Clark’s much more influential work on administratively 
workable competition.70 For Clark, the problem of government 
restraints on business behavior was simply a variation on the 
general social problem of controlling deviancy by reference to 
some articulated norm. He adopted the Ricardian notion, popular 
with the Progressives, that the common law is biased because it 
tends to bleed resources in the direction of those who already 
have economic power.71 While he began with a wholesale indict-
 
 65. See generally BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ 
FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 2–28 
(1998) (detailing the life and legal theories of Robert Hale). 
 66. See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-
Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 470 (1923) (“[T]he systems advocated by pro-
fessed upholders of laissez-faire are in reality permeated with coercive restric-
tions of individual freedom . . . .”).  
 67. Cf. Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science 253–56 
(1991). 
 68. For an excellent discussion of control devices, see id. at 219–56 (1991). 
 69. JOHN MAURICE CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1926). 
 70. Clark, supra note 57, at 241–46. See generally discussion infra Part IV.A 
(exploring Clark’s ideas put forth in the essay). 
 71. See CLARK, supra note 69, at 10 (describing the development of the Eng-
lish “law merchant,” which in Clark’s estimation was well-suited to construing 
contracts between traders fairly, but was strongly biased in favor of traders when 
they contracted with members of other classes). For the most forceful Progressive 
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ment of the traditional system of private property and contract 
rights, Clark also found significant that inefficiencies resulted 
from public ownership of the means of production.72 He concluded 
that the best way to guarantee the public interest in a healthy 
economy and low prices was private ownership with a mixture of 
regulatory and competition-enhancing legal rules.73 
The development of a theory of costs was one of marginal-
ism’s most significant contributions to industrial economics, but 
early on the theory also created its most imposing problems. The 
classical political economists had only the vaguest notion about 
the relation between costs and different levels of output. Margi-
nalism changed that by developing mathematical concepts of 
fixed, variable, and marginal costs. In his Principles of Econom-
ics, Marshall had already noted that certain costs were highly 
responsive to demand in a short time period, while other costs 
such as those for land or durable plants or equipment were not. 
As a result, in the short run, price might be quite responsive to 
changes in demand because new capacity could not quickly be 
brought into an industry. However, in the long run, new plants 
would be built, and prices closer to the competitive level would 
prevail.74 Whenever output responses lagged behind demand, in 
either direction, the market price had little to do with cost. As 
Marshall observed, “there is no connection between cost of repro-
duction and price in the case[] of food in a beleaguered city.”75 
For the classicists and most early marginalists, a “cost” was 
something that was incurred and paid off in a single production 
cycle, such as the farmer’s seed or the baker’s flour.76 Fixed costs 
were investments in land, plant, durable equipment, intellectual 
 
exposition, see generally RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR 
RELATION TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH (1914). 
 72. See CLARK, supra note 69, at 420–25 (debunking the notion that public 
ownership always offers significant savings to communities and noting that head-
to-head comparisons of efficiency often favor the private operation of enterprises). 
 73. See id. at 459 (arguing that governments need not “wait passively for 
the mills of supply and demand” to “grind out” economic changes, but instead 
should “take the initiative” and “experiment to see how wide the range is with-
in which the forces of supply and demand will not absolutely veto” price and 
wage levels). 
 74. See MARSHALL, supra note 24, at 349 (“If the demand happens to be 
great, the market price will rise for a time above the [normal] level; but as a re-
sult production will increase and the market price will fall . . . .”); Ragnar Frisch, 
Alfred Marshall’s Theory of Value, 64 Q.J. ECON. 495, 519–24 (1950) (analyzing 
and expanding Marshall’s reasoning). 
 75. MARSHALL, supra note 24, at 402. 
 76. Marshall, like Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, used the term “cir-
culating capital” for these types of costs. See id. at 75 & n.2. 
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property, and other things whose life was either indefinite or else 
lasted much longer than a single season of production and sale.77 
An important attribute of fixed costs was that per-unit costs of 
production declined as output went up, for fixed costs could be al-
located over a larger output.78 For example, if the mortgage pay-
ments on a plant are $1000 per month, per-unit costs for the 
plant are $100 per unit if the plant produces ten units per month, 
but they are only $1 per unit if the plant produces 1000 units per 
month. If variable costs are small by comparison—say, 50 cents 
per unit—then a firm could earn a profit at drastically lower 
prices if its output were sufficiently high. 
In sum, fixed costs created production “economies of scale” 
whenever per-unit costs were lower in firms that operated at high 
rates of output. This fact in turn suggested that a market would 
have room for fewer firms, and perhaps fewer than needed for ef-
fective competition. Economists around the turn of the twentieth 
century were fairly obsessed with the problem of scale economies 
and the implications for competition. Indeed, a principal reason 
so many economists opposed the Sherman Act is that they be-
lieved that monopoly was more or less inevitable in many indus-
tries and that antitrust legislation would force firms to be ineffi-
ciently small.79 For example, Yale economist and later university 
president Arthur Twining Hadley opposed the Sherman Act on 
economic grounds, arguing that either monopoly or collusion was 
necessary in industries with high fixed costs, lest they be driven 
into ruinous competition and bankruptcy.80 
Unlike the social control theorists in other social sciences, 
Clark was not a behaviorist.81 His principles of decision making 
were rooted in neoclassical price theory, which means that he as-
sumed firms and their managers behaved so as to maximize prof-
 
 77. Marshall, Smith, and Mill called these costs “fixed capital.” See id. 
 78. See id. at 75 (“[T]he return [on fixed capital of given durability] is 
spread over a period of corresponding duration.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 79. See Henry R. Hatfield, The Chicago Trust Conference, 8 J. POL. ECON. 1, 
6 (1899) (“The weight of evidence . . . supported the view that the modern system 
of large business establishments was the outgrowth of natural industrial evolu-
tion.”). See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, at 308–22 (discussing in detail 
the fixed-cost controversy). 
 80. See ARTHUR TWINING HADLEY, ECONOMICS 294–95 (New York, G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons 1896) (discussing the crippling effect of “over-production” and 
“cut-throat competition” on industries in which business “owners have invested 
their capital in a form which they cannot readily change”).  
 81. ROSS, supra note 68, at 413 (quoting an unpublished letter from Clark to 
Wesley Clair Mitchell). 
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its. Working from that assumption the problems of high fixed 
costs were manifold.82 First, they made marginal cost pricing—
and thus perfect competition—impossible because a marginal 
cost price would not give a firm enough return to cover its fixed- 
cost investment. Second, industries with high fixed costs would 
feel constrained to keep their output very high in order to keep 
per-unit costs low. Indeed, any price above the average variable 
cost was profitable in the sense that it made some contribution to 
fixed costs. The result was ruinous competition in which market-
wide prices would be driven to marginal cost without enough left 
over to cover fixed costs.83 This in turn led to a very high risk of 
collusion in such markets as firms tried to avoid ruinous competi-
tion. Third, high fixed costs explained and justified many in-
stances of price discrimination. The firm continuously tried to sell 
all it could to any customer willing to pay enough to cover varia-
ble costs.84 As a result, price discrimination was not a monopoly 
problem as such, but was ubiquitous in industries with high fixed 
costs and not necessarily evil.85 Fourth, extreme cases of over-
head costs can lead to natural monopoly. As Clark observed: 
 [W]here the economies of increased size remain decisive, up to the 
point of absorbing the entire market, the business becomes a “natural 
monopoly.” Competition is impossible or intolerably wasteful, and the 
public must secure to itself as much as it can of the advantages of 
large-scale efficiency (which should properly be no one’s permanent 
private property) by regulation of prices and service.86 
The fixed-cost controversy originated in disputes about rail-
road rates, where fixed costs were extremely high.87 But it quick-
ly expanded into ordinary manufacturing. Problematically, once a 
large fixed-cost asset such as a plant was built it had to be paid 
for whether or not it was used. In an industry with high fixed 
costs and multiple producers, fixed costs were thought to lead to 
ruinous competition, which occurred when each firm kept its own 
output as high as possible in order to keep costs down. The result 
 
 82. See JOHN MAURICE CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD 
COSTS 46–69 (1923) (exploring in detail the effects of fixed costs upon businesses).  
 83. See John Maurice Clark, Monopolistic Tendencies, Their Character and 
Consequences, 18 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. 124, 130 (1939) (“[T]he natural tendency 
of [one form of competition Clark analyzed] was to drive prices to a level which, 
while above ‘marginal’ cost . . . would be quite far below average cost.”). 
 84. On this problem in the nineteenth-century railroad industry, see Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Rail-
road Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1017–72 (1988). 
 85. CLARK, supra note 82, at 433. 
 86. CLARK, supra note 69, at 312. 
 87. See Hovenkamp, supra note 84, at 1035–44. 
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was prices that were high enough to cover operating costs but in-
sufficient to pay off the fixed-cost investment.88 
The ruinous competition theory assumed that the goods be-
ing overproduced were fungible, or indistinguishable from one 
seller to another. For example, Alfred Marshall’s conception of 
the “representative firm” in an industry entailed that every firm 
in a market had cost and production functions that were to be 
counted as identical, and prices were driven to marginal cost.89 
As a result, firms competed only on price and any sale above 
marginal cost was profitable in the short run. 
The theory of fixed costs had an influence on Progressive Era 
social policy that is rarely obvious to political historians but is 
nevertheless difficult to exaggerate. The theory readily migrated 
from the economics of industrial organization to the welfare eco-
nomics of social policy and wealth redistribution. Fixed costs ex-
plained why firms became large—because they could produce 
more cheaply. It also explained overproduction—once a plant was 
built, maximum output resulted in lower costs and enabled man-
agers to bid lower prices. Importantly, however, fixed costs also 
appeared to explain why wealth tended to move toward capital 
rather than toward labor. First, large fixed-cost investments such 
as plants had to be carried in both times of high output and low. 
Labor, by contrast, was a variable cost to the capitalist and could 
be dropped on a moment’s notice in times of low demand. The ca-
pitalist responding to recession could not avoid the mortgage 
payments on the plant but he could readily lay workers off. 
Second, while labor is a variable cost to the employer, it is in 
many senses a “fixed” cost to the laborer himself. He must eat, 
clothe, and shelter himself and his family whether or not he is 
working, just as the plant must be paid for when it lies idle.  
One of Clark’s most controversial proposals was that for so-
cial purposes the laborer be treated as a fixed rather than a vari-
 
 88. See HADLEY, supra note 80, at 295. 
 89. See MARSHALL, supra note 74, at 317 (discussing the characteristics of a 
“representative producer”). The theory was vigorously attacked as creating an 
inconsistency between the assumption of fixed costs and scale economies on one 
hand, and perfect competition on the other. See, e.g., Lionel Robbins, The Repre-
sentative Firm, 38 ECON. J. 387, 399 (1928) (describing the concept of the “repre-
sentative firm” as “not only unnecessary, but misleading”); Piero Sraffa, The 
Laws of Returns Under Competitive Conditions, 36 ECON. J. 535, 540 (1926) (ar-
guing that the concept “can prove a useful instrument only in regard to such ex-
ceptional industries as can reasonably satisfy its conditions”). On the birth and 
death of the concept, see generally James A. Maxwell, Some Marshallian Con-
cepts, Especially the Representative Firm, 68 ECON. J. 691, 694–99 (1958); J.N. 
Wolfe, The Representative Firm, 64 ECON. J. 337, 337–38 (1954). 
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able cost—that is, as an investment whose support must be paid 
for whether or not the laborer is currently employed.90 That pro-
posal naturally had social consequences that went far beyond the 
economics of industrial organization, reaching to such things as 
guaranteed employment or unemployment compensation.91 Clark 
himself believed that the worst evil of economic depression was 
the fact that wages could instantly be withdrawn, leaving masses 
of unemployed, even as the mortgage payments on plants contin-
ued to be paid.92 An additional consequence of making labor costs 
variable is that it enabled the employer to avoid the full social 
cost of labor, which included the costs of fatigue, injuries, and 
health care.93 Once again, the owner of a plant needed to keep it 
in repair in order to maintain productivity, but he could instantly 
drop a sick laborer and replace him with another at little or no 
cost to himself.94 
By the late nineteenth century the problem of fixed costs was 
already well-known in both the economics and legal literatures.95 
Indeed, the notion that competition between two transportation 
utilities could be ruinous was already known in the 1830s, when 
litigants before the Supreme Court cited Chancellor Kent for that 
 
 90. See CLARK, supra note 82, at 384 (insisting that labor must be treated as 
an overhead cost for “purposes concerned with unemployment” and that “[t]he 
only question is as to the best distribution of the burden”). Clark originally made 
the suggestion in a paper presented to the American Economic Association in 
1920. See SHUTE, supra note 57, at 57. 
 91. See CLARK, supra note 82, at 411 (arguing that “more could be accom-
plished if the resources of private industry itself were enlisted” to ease the 
burden of unemployment, and predicting that “this will be done as fast as pri-
vate industry comes to feel and to bear . . . responsibility commensurate with 
its powers and opportunities”). 
 92. See id. at 376 (attributing most of the cost of unemployment compen-
sation to “seasonal and cyclical fluctuations in industry” and proposing 
“[r]emedies for this evil”). 
 93. See CLARK, supra note 69, at 178 (“Thus the worker may be paid for 
his actual labor, but the risks of injury, of occupational disease, or of unem-
ployment, considered as separate costs, may not receive any compensation at 
all . . . .”). 
 94. See id. at 157 (explaining that, because of the force of competition in la-
bor, “[l]aborers in general are not in a position to bargain for extra pay for trade 
practices which make their labor conditions unduly burdensome, unhealthy, or 
dangerous”). 
 95. See, e.g., HADLEY, supra note 80, at 295; Henry C. Adams, Relation of the 
State to Industrial Action, 1 PUBLICATIONS AM. ECON. ASS’N 465, 523–28 (1887); 
F.W. Taussig, A Contribution to the Theory of Railway Rates, 5 Q.J. ECON. 438, 
440–41 (1891). On the fixed-cost controversy in American competition policy, see 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, at 308–22. 
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proposition in the Charles River Bridge case.96 Justice Story ac-
cepted it as a rationale for his dissent, which argued basically 
that competition was so destructive to the business of a toll 
bridge that no reasonable investor would have agreed to build 
without a monopoly guarantee.97 The problem of high fixed costs 
was understood sufficiently well in the railroad industry that 
both railroad lawyers and the Interstate Commerce Commission 
used it to justify railroad “pools,” or cartels, designed in part to 
keep rates high enough to cover fixed costs.98 The Supreme Court 
heard these arguments in two major antitrust cases in the late 
1890s, but rejected them, holding that the Sherman Act made no 
exception for industries prone to ruinous competition.99 
By the turn of the century, many economists began to see the 
fixed-cost problem as much more general, affecting ordinary 
manufacturing as well as railroads and public utilities.100 As a 
result, many came to believe that either monopoly or collusion 
was virtually inevitable in many manufacturing markets unless 
the state intervened. Further, antitrust intervention was not 
what they had in mind, for it did no more than condemn practices 
 
 96. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 
U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 436 (1837). 
 97. See id. at 649–50 (Story, J., dissenting); see also W. Union Tel. Co. v. Un-
ion Pac. Ry. Co., 3 F. 423, 425 (C.C.D. Kan. 1880) (noting the possibility of ruin-
ous competition from the running of parallel telegraph lines by competing firms); 
cf. Morgan v. New Orleans, M.&T.R.R. Co., 17 F. Cas. 754, 754, 758 (C.C.D. La. 
1876) (No. 9804) (declining to rescind a contract dividing the market between its 
signatories, two companies operating railroads and steamships, in order to limit 
ruinous competition). 
 98. E.g., Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. Co., 61 F. 
993, 996–97 (8th Cir. 1894) (holding that pooling is permissible if it is designed to 
prevent ruinous competition, but not if its purpose is “to stifle all competition for 
the purpose of raising rates”); Cent. Trust Co. v. Ohio Cent. Ry. Co., 23 F. 306, 
309–10 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1885) (upholding a pooling agreement), rev’d on other 
grounds, 133 U.S. 83 (1890); Nashua & L.R.R. Corp. v. Boston & L.R.R. Corp., 19 
F. 804, 805–06 (C.C.D. Mass. 1884) (same), rev’d on other grounds, 136 U.S. 356 
(1890); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 84, at 1039–42 (discussing the rationale 
for and development of pooling). 
 99. See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 519–26, 527–33, 
577 (1898) (summarizing the arguments of James Coolidge Carter for the Joint 
Traffic Association and E.J. Phelps for the New York Central Railroad Company 
and rejecting both); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 
328–41 (1897) (considering in detail and ultimately rejecting the arguments of 
railroad companies that Congress must have intended to exempt them from the 
Sherman Act). 
 100. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, at 317 (explaining that although lib-
eral economists continued to believe that ruinous competition would only af-
fect industries that are natural monopolies, conservatives thought ruinous 
competition could become widespread in the long run). 
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that were thought to be unavoidable given the structure of Amer-
ican industry. During the first two decades of the twentieth cen-
tury American economists debated widely whether high fixed 
costs would drive business either to ruinous competition or else to 
collusion.101 
By the 1920s, however, a consensus began to emerge that 
very high-scale economies producing truly ruinous competition 
probably existed in only a few industries. The literature began to 
develop important distinctions between long-run and short-run 
decision making, largely in an effort to explain the great merger 
movement that occurred at the turn of the twentieth century.102 
The problem with the existing models of competition, wrote 
Clark, was that they treated fixed costs as a given and saw com-
petition as driving firms to ruin, earning enough to cover variable 
costs but not fixed costs. However, in the long run a firm is free to 
make the same choices about land, plant, and durable equipment 
that it makes about inventory. To be sure, pricing and output de-
cisions in markets with high fixed costs are more complicated be-
cause the entrepreneur must live with investment decisions over 
a longer period of time. This explains such things as the great 
amount of price discrimination in such markets as firms struggle 
to keep their output up.103 While the consolidations were in-
tended to diminish ruinous competition, they also made clear 
that long-run pricing concerns would be a relatively permanent 
feature of American manufacturing across a wide variety of mar-
kets.104 Most importantly, as developed below, the rise of compe-
 
 101. For an overview of the debate, see id. at 302–22. 
 102. See, e.g., ELIOT JONES, THE TRUST PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 197–
200 (1921); MYRON W. WATKINS, INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 
28–44 (Allyn A. Young ed., 1927); Eliot Jones, Is Competition in Industry Ruin-
ous, 34 Q.J. ECON. 473, 491–97 (1920); see also 2 F.W. TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES OF 
ECONOMICS 53–54 (3d ed. 1921); Spurgeon Bell, Fixed Costs and Market Price, 32 
Q.J. ECON. 507, 509–22 (1918); F.H. Knight, Cost of Production and Price over 
Long and Short Periods, 29 J. POL. ECON. 304, 306–10 (1921). On the merger 
movement, see generally NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT 
IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895–1904, at 1–14 (1985); George Bittlingmayer, De-
creasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case, 
25 J.L. & ECON. 201, 218–28 (1982); George Bittlingmayer, Did Antitrust Policy 
Cause the Great Merger Wave?, 28 J.L. & ECON. 77, 77–79 (1985). 
 103. See F.Y. Edgeworth, 35 ECON. J. 245, 246 (1925) (reviewing CLARK, su-
pra note 82) (noting that the “designer of a new plant” is “free to make mistakes” 
like sinking too much money into it, which can greatly reduce the chances of mak-
ing a profit, although price discrimination can “increase[ ] net earnings”). 
 104. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 102, at 317–18 (discussing the interplay be-
tween long-run prices and the tendency toward monopoly). 
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tition models incorporating differentiated products largely put 
the controversy to rest.105 
III.  IMPERFECT RESOLUTION OF THE FIXED-COSTS 
CONTROVERSY IN THE 1930S: PRODUCT 
DIFFERENTIATION AND MONOPOLISITIC COMPETITION   
Marginalism became the basis for a major onslaught against 
laissez faire, mainly for two reasons. The first was the early mar-
ginalists’ theory about the effects of forced wealth redistribution, 
and the other was their theory of competition. 
Although the second reason is most important to our present 
concerns, the first deserves brief mention. One immediate impact 
of the incorporation of marginal utility theory into economics was 
a heightened interest in involuntary redistributions of wealth. 
The marginalists following Jevons knew that utility maximiza-
tion requires the individual actor to equate utilities at the mar-
gin, and they automatically assumed that this formulation held 
good for the distribution of wealth or other entitlements among 
different persons. The great Cambridge economists Alfred Mar-
shall, Arthur Pigou, and Joan Robinson all believed that money 
transfers from wealthier to less wealthy individuals increased to-
tal welfare, for poorer individuals placed a higher value on a 
marginal dollar than did wealthier ones. They believed that the 
marginal utility of an additional dollar to someone who already 
had thousands must be much less than it would be to someone 
who had nothing.106 As a result, Pigou107 and Robinson108 both 
toyed with socialism to one degree or another, although Marshall 
was more ambivalent.109 For empirical verification, they observed 
 
 105. See infra Part III. 
 106. See, e.g., MARSHALL, supra note 74, at 2 (“It may make little difference 
to the fullness of life of a family whether its yearly income is £1000 or £5000; 
but it makes a very great difference whether the income is £30 or £150 . . . .”). 
 107. See Roger E. Backhouse & Steven G. Medema, Public Choice and the 
Cambridge School: A New View 21–26 (Nov. 30, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=949203 (laying 
out Pigou’s belief that recent improvements in the structure of government were 
sufficient to overcome the problem of political self-interest that had doomed so-
cialism in the past). 
 108. See Prue Kerr, Joan Robinson and Socialist Planning in the Years of 
High Theory, 31 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 489, 492 (2007) (explaining Robinson’s “ar-
gument that laisser-faire capitalism had failed to provide full employment and a 
desirable allocation of labour and resources”). 
 109. See Backhouse & Medema, supra note 107, at 8–21 (elucidating Mar-
shall’s thoughts on the role of the state in business, including his conclusion that 
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that the impoverished would be likely to spend that dollar on 
food, clothing, or shelter, which were high utility goods, while the 
wealthier will already have satisfied those needs.110 
These views were subsequently criticized by John Hicks and 
Lionel Robbins, leading to a “Paretian” revolution in neoclassical 
welfare economics, after which the welfare consequences of pure 
wealth transfers no longer had unambiguous answers.111 The ba-
sis of the revolution was the idea, now a matter of fundamental 
neoclassical doctrine, that although a single individual can rank 
his or her own preferences, the strength of preferences cannot be 
compared from one person to another.112 Neoclassical economics 
once again became more-or-less agnostic on the question of the 
welfare effects of involuntary wealth redistributions.113 
During the interval from roughly 1890 until roughly 1935, 
however, marginalist economists in England generally believed 
that the “social net product,” as Pigou called it, could be increased 
through forced wealth redistribution.114 This appeared to justify 
the state’s hand in the economy in a big way. The impetus to in-
volve the state was increased by neoclassical studies such as 
John Maurice Clark’s Economics of Overhead Costs, which con-
cluded that industrial production tends naturally to transfer 
 
despite socialism’s theoretical appeal, it could not overcome the inherent corrup-
tion, inefficiency, and self-interest of government). 
 110. See Robert Cooter & Peter Rappoport, Were Ordinalists Wrong About 
Welfare Economics?, 22 J. ECON. LITERATURE 507, 517 (1984) (“Pigou and 
Marshall believed that the poor would tend to use additional money in the 
most useful ways.”). 
 111. See J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 
696, 711–12 (1939); Lionel Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A 
Comment, 48 ECON. J. 635, 635–41 (1938). 
 112. See Hicks, supra note 111, at 699 (“[W]e have to face . . . the difficulty 
of inter-personal comparisons. . . . You cannot take a temperature when you 
have to use, not one thermometer, but an immense number of different ther-
mometers, working on different principles, and with no necessary correlation 
between their registrations.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the 
Classical Theory of Competition, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1019, 1022 (1989) (“[T]he 
role of economics in policymaking . . . was effectively torpedoed by the vehe-
ment, religious argument of the ordinalists that changes in marginal utility 
cannot be compared among different persons.”). 
 113. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Move-
ment, 42 STAN. L. REV. 993, 995 (1990). See generally Cooter & Rappoport, supra 
note 110, at 526–28 (discussing the “ordinance revolution” of the 1930s, which 
rejected cardinal notions of utility and generally accepted the view that utility 
was not comparable across individuals). 
 114. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Knowledge About Welfare: Legal Realism 
and the Separation of Law and Economics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 805, 810 (2000) 
(“[M]arginalist economic theory . . . justif[ied] widespread, state-enforced 
wealth distribution.”). 
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wealth away from labor and toward capitalists.115 That is, the 
natural consequences of the redistributions brought about by ca-
pitalism were regressive. 
The second reason for marginalism’s doubt about laissez 
faire lay more centrally in price theory and industrial economics. 
The mathematics of marginalism enabled the neoclassicists to 
make distinctions that the classicists could not even compre-
hend.116 Problems that the classicists simply did not recognize or 
else acknowledged only in a much less technical fashion included 
the realizations that: economic actors equate their utilities at the 
margin and that firms maximize profits; when a firm is maximiz-
ing profits, marginal cost equals marginal revenue; both product 
differentiation and declining costs are ubiquitous and inconsis-
tent with perfect competition; and economic equilibria can be de-
fined for markets that are neither monopolized nor perfectly 
competitive.117 
One of the unforeseen consequences of marginalism is that 
the stubbornness of these problems often led to policy conclusions 
that seemed overly broad and somewhat hastily developed when 
considered in retrospect.118 Both cost theory and, subsequently, 
monopolistic competition theory, are good examples. Their impact 
served to undermine confidence in competition in a great many 
markets, not merely structural monopolies.119 They were to have 
severe implications for both antitrust policy and regulatory policy 
through the first half of the twentieth century. 
A. IMPERFECT COMPETITION 
In 1933, Cambridge University’s Joan Robinson published 
her Economics of Imperfect Competition, the first systematic ap-
plication of marginalist analysis to product-differentiated mar-
 
 115. See CLARK, supra note 82, at 7–9; supra notes 90–94 and accompanying 
text. 
 116. See Hovenkamp, supra note 112, at 1021–23 (arguing that, with the 
advent of marginalist mathematics, the neoclassicists were able to further 
their knowledge of “competition” beyond the classicists).  
 117. Cf. id. at 1025–29 (outlining the classical and neoclassical conceptions 
of competition). 
 118. Cf. id. at 1024 (citing Justice Burrough’s statement that public policy 
“is a very unruly horse, and once you get astride it you can never know where 
it will carry you” to highlight the pitfalls of economic policymaking). 
 119. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. 
REV. 213, 257 (1985) (arguing that real world markets result in skewed appli-
cation of economic theories by courts, which resulted in less confidence in be-
fore-and-after comparisons of empirical information). 
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kets.120 In such markets, firms have somewhat downward-sloping 
demand curves, which mean that they have a certain amount of 
discretion over price.121 Robinson developed the concept of a con-
tinuous “marginal revenue” curve and showed how product diffe-
rentiation affected the choice of output and price by firms that 
have some discretion over what output to produce and what price 
to charge.122 For such a firm, charging a slightly higher price does 
not entail losing all of its sales, as it does for the perfect competi-
tor.123 Rather, the firm in imperfect competition typically sells 
slightly less as it charges a slightly higher price, or slightly more 
as it cuts price.124 
Robinson’s work analyzed why product-differentiated mar-
kets tended to work more poorly than markets for fungible prod-
ucts. Mainly, in differentiated markets prices tended to be above 
marginal cost, price discrimination was relatively common, and 
firms had incentive to differentiate their products further in or-
der to avoid the consequences of head-to-head competition.125 Ro-
binson generally assumed that there were no barriers to entry by 
new firms.126 As a result, firms continuously differentiated their 
products in order to escape from close rivals.127 
The principal distinction between Marshall’s Principles of 
Economics and Robinson’s Imperfect Competition is in the nature 
of the paradigm “firm” that the two authors imagined. While 
Marshall took on some of the mathematics of marginalism, the 
firm for him remained the classical enterprise producing a fungi-
ble good in intense competition with other firms, or else a mono-
polist not facing any competitors.128 In sharp contrast, Robinson’s 
 
 120. ROBINSON, supra note 31, at 92–94. 
 121. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, Analyzing Monopoly Power Ex Ante, 5 N.Y.U. J. 
L. & BUS. 153, 197 n.189 (2009) (“[T]he seller of virtually any good in the most 
competitive markets has some ability to choose price (that is, faces a down-
ward-sloping demand curve) . . . .”).  
 122. See ROBINSON, supra note 31, at 51–55 (discussing marginal revenue). 
 123. See id. at 316–17 (arguing that monopolists do harm when costs are 
rising as there are no alternatives for consumers). 
 124. See id. at 51. 
 125. See id. at 179–80. 
 126. See id. at 92–93 (“The abnormal profits are a symptom rather than a 
cause of the situation in which new firms will find it profitable to enter the 
trade. But the artificial device regarding the abnormal profits as a causal fac-
tor is of great assistance in simplifying the formal argument . . . .”). 
 127. See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 41, at 72 (“Where the possibility of diffe-
rentiation exists . . . sales depend upon the skill with which the good is distin-
guished from others and made to appeal to a particular group of buyers.”). 
 128. See generally MARSHALL, supra note 74. 
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Imperfect Competition imagined a manufacturing world much 
more like the one we actually have, in which products are some-
what differentiated from one another yet compete.129 Thus the 
real jolt of Imperfect Competition lay in its theorizing that real-
world markets in fact perform much less robustly than econo-
mists had imagined. While the classicists were correct that true 
monopoly was the exception rather than the rule, they were far 
too sanguine about everything else. Robinson observed that 
“economists, misled by the logical priority of perfect competition 
in their scheme, were somehow trapped into thinking that it 
must be of equal importance in the real world.”130 But in fact “the 
real world did not fulfill the assumptions of perfect competi-
tion.”131 Or as Joseph Schumpeter observed in a review of Robin-
son’s book, the “common practice” of political economy through 
Marshall had been to look “at the whole stretch of ground be-
tween the two limiting cases [monopoly and perfect competition] 
as rather unsafe and incapable of yielding determinate re-
sults.”132 However, “[a]s the majority of practical cases lie on that 
stretch,” the result was “highly unsatisfactory.” 
Things look still worse as soon as we realize that the case of free com-
petition cannot be looked upon as an approximation, and that it be-
comes a distortion of what it is meant to describe if its assumptions 
are not fulfilled exactly. To complete our discomfiture, analysis of 
these assumptions and the resulting correct formulation of them re-
veal the fact that they are much farther removed from reality and 
much less likely to be fulfilled than even Marshall probably 
thought.133 
Notwithstanding all of this talk about the “real world,” the 
lack of empirical information in Robinson’s book is stunning. 
Fundamentally, Imperfect Competition is a geometry text that 
draws certain curves and lines based on assumptions about how 
rational actors, including business firms, behave. In Robinson’s 
case, the assumptions were utility maximization for biological 
persons134 or profit maximization for business firms.135 She 
 
 129. See ROBINSON, supra note 31, at 4–5 (emphasizing the difficulty in 
defining the world in either a perfectly monopolistic or competitive sense). 
 130. Id. at 3–4. 
 131. Id. at 4. 
 132. Schumpeter, supra note 35, at 249. 
 133. Id. at 249–50. 
 134. See ROBINSON, supra note 31, at 218 (“The principle underlying the 
analysis of the decisions of a buyer as to how much of a commodity to buy is 
that he will equate marginal utility to marginal cost.”). 
 135. See id. at 16–17 (arguing that the entrepreneur, the controlling inter-
est of a firm, is assumed to maximize profits). 
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stated as her most fundamental assumption that “each individual 
acts in a sensible manner in the circumstances in which he finds 
himself from the point of view of his own economic interests.”136 
“Sensible” meant profit maximization.137  
Robinson’s ideological subtext was relatively clear, however. 
“We see on every side a drift towards monopolisation . . . .”138 
Further, Robinson believed that capitalist entrepreneurs were 
systematically transferring wealth toward themselves and away 
from the one set of participants in the economy who were unable 
to differentiate their output effectively—namely, labor.139 Soon 
after Imperfect Competition was published, Robinson became a 
Keynesian and an active socialist in the British Labour Party.140 
B. PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND THE MONOPOLISTIC 
COMPETITION REVOLUTION 
In a market of fungible products, consumers are indifferent 
to everything but price.141 However, if products are differentiated 
the calculus of choice becomes much more complex. Some cus-
tomers may still buy strictly on price, but others will be drawn to 
features present in one version of the product but not others. The 
greater the “space” between a product and its most adjacent com-
petitor, the larger these preference differences are likely to be. 
Further, they are exacerbated by market factors that limit prod-
uct mobility. The more difficult it is to redesign a product to look 
like a successful rival’s, the more robust that rival’s success will 
be. This accounts for the very large power of intellectual property 
rights in product-differentiated markets. Such rights only rarely 
create “monopolies” in the economic sense, but they do tend to 
 
 136. Id. at 15. 
 137. See id. at 16 (“[An individual] is assumed always to choose the output 
which will maximise his net receipts.”). 
 138. Id. at 307. 
 139. See id. at 281–304 (discussing monopolistic and monopsonistic exploi-
tation of labor). 
 140. See generally SOCIALISM AND MARGINALISM IN ECONOMICS: 1870–
1930, at 10–20 (Ian Steedman ed., 1995) (focusing mainly on Continental Eu-
rope and other non-English speaking countries); Bertram Schefold, Are Eco-
nomic Theories Historically Specific?, in THE ECONOMICS OF JOAN ROBINSON 
312 (Maria Cristina Marcuzzo et al. eds., 1996) (noting Robinson’s position 
with respect to socialism and Anglo-Italian economic theory); Kerr, supra note 
108, at 491–503 (discussing Robinson’s later career and her flirtation with so-
cialism). 
 141. See COURNOT, supra note 21, at 46 (“The cheaper an article is, the 
greater ordinarily is the demand for it. . . . [T]he sales or the demand generally 
. . . increases when the price decreases.”).  
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create or preserve product differentiation by making it more diffi-
cult for one firm to copy another firm’s product precisely.142 
Product differentiation undermined most of the arguments 
from prior to the 1930s that high fixed costs led to ruinous com-
petition, largely ending the fixed-cost controversy.143 Under the 
prevailing Marshallian model in vogue in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, competitive equilibrium was seen as 
inconsistent with fixed costs, and the attempts to solve this puz-
zle within an industry producing an identical product were all 
technical failures.144 However, firms making differentiated prod-
ucts did not simply manufacture more and more as long as price 
was above marginal cost; rather they invested in distinguishing 
their products in order to avoid head-to-head competition.145 As 
University of Texas economist Spurgeon Bell had observed al-
ready in 1918: 
If fixed costs are large there must be a style or brand competition on 
the one hand or, on the other hand, consolidation of producers similar 
to that which took place in the steel industry, in the railroads, and in 
various large-plant industries producing goods of a comparatively 
staple character.146 
While the product differentiation models of the early 1930s 
largely solved the ruinous competition problem, they substituted 
another set of unsettling market imperfections—most significant-
ly, equilibria in which prices were significantly above marginal 
cost and firms carried excess capacity.147 The result was a signifi-
 
 142. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 372–402 (2003) (examining the 
complex relationship between intellectual property rights and monopoly under 
antitrust law). 
 143. See discussion supra Part II. 
 144. See JAN KEPPLER, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION THEORY: ORIGINS, 
RESULTS, AND IMPLICATIONS 46–121 (1994) (discussing at length the attempts 
and failures of a number of economists seeking to solve this problem); Steven 
Brakman & Ben J. Heijdra, Introduction to THE MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
REVOLUTION IN RETROSPECT 1, 4–7 (Steven Brakman & Ben J. Heijdra eds., 
2004) (discussing Marshall’s own struggles with the problem). 
 145. See Bell, supra note 102, at 520 (“Where the staple character of the 
commodity can be modified by the production of different brands, the coöpera-
tive relation is much more secure. It is very difficult to prevent cutthroat com-
petition among the producers of ordinary salt because it is not possible . . . to 
use a variety of brands to good effect.”). 
 146. Id. at 523; see also Jones, supra note 102, at 491–97 (discussing the 
effect of competition on the railroad industry).  
 147. See William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent 
Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 368 (1966) (arguing that 
excess capacity can be avoided when prices are above marginal cost so long as 
the monopolist’s competitors do not enter the market). 
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cant change in the focus of competition policy. With the exception 
of price fixing, which is quite common in markets for fungible 
products, antitrust policy since the 1940s has been preoccupied 
mainly with anticompetitive practices in product-differentiated 
markets.148 This was particularly true of the law of vertical re-
straints. 
During the middle part of the twentieth century, Chamber-
lin’s monopolistic competition model became the ruling model of 
competition theory.149 Incorporating product differentiation into 
competitive economic models produced important conclusions 
that most of the economists involved in the fixed-cost controversy 
had not anticipated. The general problem of ruinous competition 
was much less imposing because firms in a differentiated market 
could obtain higher prices by keeping their own output in check. 
Increasingly, ruinous competition came to be seen as unique to 
markets such as those for commodities, where goods or services 
could not readily be differentiated, and thus firms were required 
to compete on price alone.150 At the same time, perfect competi-
tion was not in the cards either because prices were always above 
marginal cost—indeed, it was the drive toward marginal cost 
pricing in industries with high fixed cost that led competitors to 
ruin. 
Chamberlin’s model generally assumed a sufficiently large 
number of firms in a market that Cournot-style coordination of 
output was not significant.151 Further, entry was easy. However, 
each firm also produced a variation of the product that was dis-
tinguishable in the eyes of buyers.152 As a result buyers preferred 
one firm’s offering over others, but buyers’ individual preferences 
 
 148. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Criti-
que, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257, 257 (2001) (discussing the push in the 
1980s to develop an economic system more sensitive to anticompetitive beha-
vior). 
 149. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1150–
51 (Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter ed., 1954) (“The Theory of Monopolistic Com-
peitition [that] sprang . . . from Professor E.H. Chamberlin’s head . . . met with 
a corresponding success . . . .”). See generally CHAMBERLIN, supra note 41, at 
1–16 (outlining his monopolistic competition model). 
 150. See Jones, supra note 102, at 495 (“If a reduction in prices under these 
circumstances has any effect . . . it must be either to attract away business of a 
competitor (to his detriment), or to induce dealers to lay in supplies for the fu-
ture, which spoils the market. In either event the outcome is injurious to the 
[commodities] trade.”). 
 151. See generally CHAMBERLIN, supra note 41. 
 152. See id. at 71–72 (outlining firms’ efforts to distinguish their products). 
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varied from one firm to the next.153 As a result, each firm faced a 
demand curve that sloped downward, allowing the firm to sell 
more by cutting its price. Firms continuously repositioned them-
selves in such a market by seeking to differentiate their own of-
ferings from those of rivals, but also by copying the offerings of 
rivals who appeared to be earning higher returns.154 The mathe-
matics of monopolistic competition are complex; however, Cham-
berlin concluded that while in the short run firms would earn 
some profits in the form of prices higher than marginal cost, in 
the long run these profits would be frittered away as other firms 
duplicate that firm’s successes or the firm invests in further diffe-
rentiation in order to protect its profits.155 Long-run profits are 
zero, or just enough to pay off fixed-cost investments at the com-
petitive rate. Further, in equilibrium, monopolistically competi-
tive firms are always carrying excess capacity; that is, they could 
be producing more product, but would be forced by decreasing 
demand to cut the price toward marginal cost. 
IV.  CONSENSUS AND WORKABILITY IN COMPETITION 
POLICY   
Robinson and Chamberlin’s works were widely viewed as 
placing a severe limitation on the classical idea that competition 
is robust and that markets tend toward it.156 This in turn was 
thought to explain at least part of the subsequent antitrust hos-
tility toward such things as advertising and “excessive” product 
differentiation, which reached its high point in the 1970s.157 
 
 153. See id. at 69 (“[W]hen products are differentiated, buyers are given a 
basis for preference, and will therefore be paired with sellers, not in random 
fashion . . . but according to these preferences.”). 
 154. Cf. id. at 83–84 (arguing that an increase in profit attracts competi-
tors into the field). 
 155. See id. at 72 (“Where the possibility of differentiation exists . . . sales 
depend upon the skill with which the good is distinguished from others and 
made to appeal to a particular group of buyers.”). 
 156. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American 
Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1672 (1988) (“The great events signalling 
[sic] the fall of neoclassical political economy were the publication of Joan Ro-
binson’s Economics of Imperfect Competition and Edward Chamberlin’s Theory 
of Monopolistic Competition in 1933.”).  
 157. See, e.g., WILLIAM S. COMANOR & THOMAS A. WILSON, ADVERTISING 
AND MARKET POWER 245 (1974) (“[A]dvertising creates a significant barrier to 
new competition in a number of important industries.”); B. Curtis Eaton & Ri-
chard G. Lipsey, Product Differentiation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL OR-
GANIZATION 723, 726 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989) (citing 
Chamberlin’s study to show that product differentiation can result in firms’ 
equilibrium being “less than minimum efficient scale”); Richard A. Posner, The 
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Many members of the Chicago School rejected the theory of mo-
nopolistic competition for being too complex and excessively 
structuralist, in the sense that it elevated structure and mini-
mized the importance of behavior as the principal determinant of 
industry performance.158 It is no wonder that in our post-
structuralist age monopolistic competition is regarded as a kind 
of throwback to New Deal interventionism.159 
In a critically important sense, however, the new theories of 
product differentiation did quite the opposite. They served to re-
store the notion of a competitive equilibrium in an era plagued by 
theory indicating that high fixed costs would lead to ruinous 
competition and either monopoly, collusion, or regulation in any 
industry with significant fixed costs. In this regard, the corrective 
force of Chamberlin’s work in particular is difficult to exaggerate. 
To be sure, monopolistic competition is not a perfectly competi-
tive equilibrium, but it is a competitive equilibrium that admits 
of large numbers of firms, is consistent with easy entry, and pro-
duces a large variety of products at costs that may be only a little 
higher than minimum efficient cost.160 
 
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 930 n.12 (1979) 
(noting the continued academic support for antitrust law’s hostility towards 
advertising); Note, Annual Style Change in the Automobile Industry as an Un-
fair Method of Competition, 80 YALE L.J. 567, 586–92 (1971) (describing pro-
duction differentiation as a barrier to entry by new firms); H. Paul Root, 
Should Product Differentiation Be Restricted?, J. MKTG., July 1972, at 3, 3 
(charging that product differentiation “created and maintained industry struc-
tures that are not competitive”). Of course, whether product differentiation is 
“excessive” depends on its degree. See Product Differentiation, supra, at 763 
(“[I]n a society that values diversity, there is a trade-off between economizing 
on resources, by reducing the costs of producing existing products, and satisfy-
ing the desire for diversity, by increasing the number of products.”). 
 158. See George J. Stigler, Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect, in FIVE 
LECTURES ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 22–24 (1949) (discussing the inadequacies 
of the theory of monopolistic competition); Louis A. Dow & Lewis M. Aberna-
thy, The Chicago School on Economic Methodology and Monopolistic Competi-
tion, 22 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 235, 238 (1963) (“The Chicago School . . . is quite 
explicit in its rejection of the model of monopolistic competition as a useful 
portion of economic analysis.”).  
 159. See Hovenkamp, supra note 114, at 819 (“[T]he new neoclassicism in-
corporated New Deal anomalies such as . . . monopolistic competition.”). But 
see Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Opti-
mum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297, 297–308 (1977) (reviving the 
monopolistic competition model as way of assessing social cost and value of 
product differentiation). 
 160. See BLAUG, supra note 15, at 391–93. 
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A. RUINOUS COMPETITION VERSUS MONOPOLISTIC 
COMPETITION 
Chamberlin’s model of monopolistic competition solved the 
ruinous competition puzzle by illustrating how firms in product-
differentiated markets would shift their efforts into repositioning 
their products rather than producing more.161 Stability in multi-
firm markets with economies of scale became possible. So how 
one looks at Chamberlin’s solution depends on the starting point. 
If one begins with perfect competition as the norm, then monopo-
listic competition creates the impression of a sick industry, pro-
ducing less than it could be producing consistent with minimum 
costs, paying for chronic excess capacity, and consuming too 
many resources on excessive product differentiation and advertis-
ing. On the other hand, if one begins with a situation in which 
competition is thought to be inherently ruinous because it denies 
firms the ability to recover fixed-cost investments, then monopo-
listic competition is actually a fairly happy alternative to the mo-
nopoly, price fixing, or regulation that ruinous competition im-
agined. 
The all-important adjustments that competition policy had to 
make were: first, learning to live with a certain amount of imper-
fection; and second, distinguishing those markets in which social-
ly acceptable amounts of competition could be sustained through 
relatively passive state policymaking, such as antitrust, from 
those that would require more active intervention. The very 
statement of these adjustments indicates that controversy was 
hardly at an end. Nevertheless, in a very important way these ad-
justments defined the terms of future debate. 
The ruinous competition debate gradually died away as 
economists developed theories of short-run and long-run costs, 
which seemed to solve most of the problems, at least in product-
differentiated markets.162 In the short run, firms might be driven 
to ruinous competition because their fixed costs are so high. 
However, in the long run excess plants will wear out and not be 
replaced and market equilibrium will be restored. John Maurice 
Clark’s path-breaking book on fixed costs set the stage for theory 
that permitted equilibria to emerge even in industries subject to 
 
 161. See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 41, at 81–100 (discussing firms’ behavior 
in product-differentiated markets to establish group equilibrium). 
 162. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of 
Industrial Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105, 140 (1989) (“John Maurice 
Clark’s influential consensus book on overhead costs generally ended the 
[ruinous competition] debate . . . .”). 
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high fixed costs.163 As Morris Copeland observed, “[e]conomic 
theory has from the start proceeded as if all the costs incurred in 
any given period of time were directly traceable to the business 
transacted during that period.”164 Or as Schumpeter said in his 
critique of Joan Robinson, “the element of time must be got hold 
of in a much more efficient manner, if for no other reason because 
what people try to maximize is certainly gain over time.”165 
Clark’s 1940 essay on Workable Competition offered a way of 
merging multiple market imperfections, namely those caused by 
fixed costs and product differentiation, into a single model for 
competition policy.166 He observed that market imperfections 
have a way of canceling each other out: “If there are, for example, 
five conditions, all of which are essential to perfect competition, 
and the first is lacking in a given case, then it no longer follows 
that we are necessarily better off for the presence of any one of 
the other four.”167 In the case of a purely fungible product, prices 
would necessarily be driven to short-run cost.168 At the other ex-
treme—wide differentiations in the product—one ends up with 
virtual monopoly.169 But in the middle one sees an area where 
competitive stability can be achieved, even though it is not quite 
perfect.170 Further, while perfect competition demands conti-
 
 163. See CLARK, supra note 82, at 432–35. 
 164. Morris A. Copeland, Book Review, 40 POL. SCI. Q. 296, 296 (1925). 
 165. Schumpeter, supra note 35, at 256. 
 166. See Clark, supra note 57, at 246–56. 
 167. Id. at 242. 
 168. See NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., VERTICAL RESTRAINTS GUIDE-
LINES (1985), reprinted in 2 PRACTISING LAW INST., 35TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST 
LAW INSTITUTE: CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 
837, 847 (1994) (“[A] fungible product . . . will produce a market with highly 
elastic demand and vigorous interbrand price competition. . . . [F]ungible 
products are subject to less product enhancement by dealers.”). 
 169. See Peter F. Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 
Upon Security Interests Created Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 
HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1424 (1968) (“[P]roduct differentiation generally leads to 
higher prices and monopoly returns . . . .”). 
 170. See id. at 241–43, 245 (“[The] [i]mportance of [the] competitive ele-
ment hinges largely on [the] extent to which quality differences are open to 
free imitation.”). John Maurice Clark made a similar point a year earlier: 
For example, it appears that the results of an open-price system may 
be to raise prices or to lower them, depending on the industry to 
which it is applied. Brands and differences of quality between compet-
ing producers are spoken of as elements of “partial monopoly”, yet if 
producers are few and large, the quality product may show on the 
whole healthier competitive conditions than the standardized prod-
uct, since in the latter case a reduction of price by one producer is 
sure to be promptly met by his rivals.  
Clark, supra note 83, at 130. 
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nuous production at capacity, in the real world plants are built 
for the long run, while market demand fluctuates over the short 
run.171 Necessarily, a plant designed for peak demand will be op-
erating at partial capacity at least some of the time.172  
Clark gave manufacturing of both automobiles and automo-
bile tires as examples of markets that were workably competitive 
notwithstanding moderate product differentiation and a relative-
ly large investment in durable plants and equipment.173 Speak-
ing of such markets he concluded that “[i]n such cases, one may 
hope that government need not assume the burden of doing 
something about every departure from the model of perfect com-
petition.”174 Speaking of the relative value of competition policy 
against its alternatives, Clark wrote: 
It will mean something if we can find, after due examination, that 
some of these forms [of imperfect or monopolistic competition] do their 
jobs well enough to be an adequate working reliance—more servicea-
ble, on the whole, than those substitutes which involve abandoning 
reliance on competition. And it will be useful if we can learn some-
thing about the kinds and degrees of “imperfection” which are posi-
tively serviceable under particular conditions.175 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST POLICY 
In the late 1930s the Roosevelt Administration undertook an 
abrupt and radical change in antitrust policy.176 The twenty-year 
 
 171. See Clark, supra note 57, at 250 (discussing at length the long-term 
and short-term ramifications of market behavior). 
 172. See id. 
 173. See id. at 256. 
 174. Id.; see also Clark, supra note 83, at 130–31: 
The kind of policy which is indicated seems to be, not a laissez-faire 
acquiescence in any and all forms of trade practices which industry 
may evolve, and not an indiscriminate condemnation of all forms of 
canalized or restricted or “imperfect” competition, regardless of 
whether the competition that is restricted is of the cutthroat variety 
or not. What seems to be called for is a realistic control of trade prac-
tices which should not simply prohibit unduly restrictive forms, but 
should assume constructive responsibility for working out for each in-
dustry, where unduly restrictive forms are found, the form which, in 
that industry, bids fair to give the nearest practicable approach to the 
results of “normal” competition . . . . It cannot be done by merely 
bombing at existing trade practices with negative “cease and desist” 
orders and letting the fragments fall where they may. 
 175. See Clark, supra note 57, at 242. 
 176. See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONO-
POLY 374 (1966) (noting that in 1937 the Department of Justice began to pros-
ecute major antitrust cases); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROO-
SEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 163 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris 
eds., 1963) (discussing that the First New Deal “told business what it must do” 
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period leading up to the New Deal has been described as an era of 
government-authorized cartels, or “cooperative competition.”177 
The early New Deal carried this thinking to the extreme, substi-
tuting state planning and organized private ordering for competi-
tion.178 The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice 
was relegated to bringing a few minor cases and staying out of 
the way of the cooperative planning that other federal agencies 
were promoting.179 
In sharp contrast, the antitrust policies ushered in as part of 
the Second New Deal were highly suspicious of any form of 
agreement among rivals and increasingly hostile toward both 
dominant firms and vertical integration. The Madison Oil case 
(Socony-Vacuum) is the best known exemplar of firms caught be-
tween the conflicting demands of two different government poli-
cies.180 With at least the tacit encouragement of the National Re-
covery Administration, the petroleum industry had undertaken a 
cartel-like self-regulatory program to control excessive output 
and ruinous competition in the petroleum industry through com-
petitor coordination.181 Then, in an abrupt switch, the govern-
 
and the Second New Deal “told business what it must not do”); MICHAEL E. 
PARRISH, ANXIOUS DECADES: AMERICA IN PROSPERITY AND DEPRESSION 296–
99 (1992) (discussing the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
which suspended antitrust laws); William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The 
Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Decon-
centration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1132 (1989) (discussing the antitrust revival 
in Roosevelt’s second term). See generally HENRY C. SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLI-
CY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 75 (1948) (discussing a contemporary’s view of the 
changes). 
 177. See RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888–
1992: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 76–89 (1996) (discussing cooperative competi-
tion in the context of trade associations); Jason E. Taylor & Peter G. Klein, An 
Anatomy of a Cartel: The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and the 
Compliance Crisis of 1934, 26 RES. ECON. HIST. 235, 242–48 (2008) (discussing 
how the government facilitated cartels through the NIRA). 
 178. See PARRISH, supra note 176, at 297 (“[N]ever had the government of 
the United States become so deeply involved in the day-to-day economic and 
social arrangements of the American people.”). 
 179. See HAWLEY, supra note 176, at 373 (noting that prior to 1937, the 
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice confined itself to mostly 
“peanut” cases). 
 180. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 201–10 
(1940) (noting the alleged federal government acquiescence to the defendants’ 
actions). Another result was expansiveness in collusion cases involving prod-
uct-differentiated markets. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 
306 U.S. 208, 232 (1939) (finding collusion between movie theaters and movie 
distributors). 
 181. See HAWLEY, supra note 176, at 374 (discussing the Madison Oil cas-
es). See generally Daniel A. Crane, The Story of United States v. Socony-
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ment issued a criminal indictment against the companies.182 Ex-
planation for the switch is generally laid to the FDR Administra-
tion’s non-ideological bent, its penchant for experimentation, and 
the loss of enthusiasm for social planning that followed Supreme 
Court decisions striking down significant portions of the first 
New Deal’s recovery agenda.183  
One hesitates to ascribe too many policy implications to a 
highly academic set of ideas about industrial organization ex-
pressed mainly as geometric figures. But the facts are powerful. 
Both the ruinous competition theories of the early century 
through the 1920s, and the monopolistic competition theories of 
the mid-1930s and after, saw severe problems in the traditional 
competitive model.184 But the implications for antitrust policy 
could not have been more different. The fixed-cost controversy led 
naturally to the view that less antitrust is better—that mergers 
should be tolerated even to the point of monopoly and that price 
fixing was otherwise inevitable. The message this sent to policy-
makers was that antitrust is a bad thing. Its main impact would 
be to prevent efficient mergers or limit socially beneficial coordi-
nation of price or output. 
By contrast, monopolistic competition theory saw a world in 
which manufacturers competed mainly by differentiating their 
products.185 Rather than overproducing, they tended to operate 
with excess capacity.186 In cases of concentrated markets and 
 
Vacuum: Hot Oil and Antitrust in the Two New Deals, in ANTITRUST STORIES 
91–119 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007) (discussing in detail the 
events leading up to the Madison Oil cases, the trial, and the aftermath). 
 182. See HAWLEY, supra note 176, at 374 (discussing the government’s 
prosecution of the petroleum industry). Daniel Crane notes that the Madison 
Oil indictment stretched back to cover a time period when the defendants 
were acting under the orders of Harold Ickes, FDR’s Secretary of the Interior, 
under the authority of section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NI-
RA), which had not yet been declared unconstitutional. See Crane, supra note 
181, at 102–03. 
 183. See, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Amazon Petroleum Corp., 293 U.S. 
388, 432–33 (1935) (invalidating section 9 of NIRA); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 595 (1935) (invalidating section 3 of NI-
RA); see also HAWLEY, supra note 176, at 127–30 (discussing Schechter Poultry 
and the end of NIRA). 
 184. See generally CHAMBERLIN, supra note 41, at 71 (discussing monopo-
listic competition); Jones, supra note 102 (discussing ruinous competition in 
the context of railroads). 
 185. See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 41, at 71 (“The volume of [a monopolistic 
competitor’s] sales depends in part upon the manner in which his product dif-
fers from that of his competitors.”). 
 186. See id. at 104–09 (noting that monopolistic competition has an equili-
brium at an excess capacity). 
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high entry barriers, monopolistic competition turned into oligopo-
ly, with its attendant low output and high prices. Product diffe-
rentiation seemed “excessive,” particularly since it was accompa-
nied by heavy expenses for advertising and other forms of 
promotion.187 Further, these were all problems that appeared to 
beg for aggressive antitrust solutions. 
V.  STRUCTURALISM IN POST-WAR COMPETITION 
THEORY   
Clark’s Workable Competition essay provided an important 
platform for working out a competition policy that took the many 
imperfections exposed by marginalist analysis into account. Sev-
eral economists offered critiques and suggested improvements.188 
Clark salvaged the policy idea that markets were sufficiently ro-
bust such that only occasional government intervention via the 
antitrust laws was justified, rather than more aggressive forms of 
regulation or simple acquiescence in monopoly. 
But this was hardly the end of the story. Classicists had gen-
erally assumed that competitive markets were more or less the 
same, with monopoly as the outstanding and relatively rare ex-
ception. But the fixed-cost controversy, the theories of imperfect 
and monopolistic competition, and Cournot oligopoly theory all 
suggested that markets in fact differ from one another, perhaps a 
great deal. This suggested in turn that a thoroughly articulated 
antitrust policy would call for different rules for markets with dif-
ferent structural characteristics, something that had previously 
attracted institutionalists such as the legal realist Walton Hamil-
ton.189 After Chamberlin, it was picked up by more mainstream 
 
 187. See id. at 171–72 (discussing selling costs in relation to excess capaci-
ty). 
 188. See, e.g., TEMP. NAT’L ECONOMIC COMM., 76TH CONG., INVESTIGATION 
OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER: COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN 
AMERICAN INDUSTRY, Monograph No. 21, at 8–9 (Comm. Print 1940) (written 
by Clair Wilcox) (“[C]ompetition may be said to be . . . workable whenever it 
operates over time to afford buyers substantial protection against exploitation 
at the hands of sellers and affords sellers similar protection . . . .”); CORWIN D. 
EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 9–10 (1949) (discussing seven charac-
teristics an economic policy should aim to achieve); George J. Stigler, The Ex-
tent and Bases of Monopoly, 32 AM. ECON. REV. (SUPP.) 1, 2–3 (1942) (“It is ne-
cessary . . . to replace the standard of competitive enterprise economy by a 
more specific comparative system . . . [such as] workable competition.”). 
 189. Walton H. Hamilton, The Problem of Anti-Trust Reform, 32 COLUM. L. 
REV. 173, 176–77 (1932) (“The simple uniformity of the older acts may have to 
give way to an accommodation of public oversight to the varying necessities of 
different trades.”). 
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competition economists, particularly at Harvard.190 One bypro-
duct was many single-industry studies illustrating the competi-
tive conditions in particular markets.191 
More ominously, product differentiation and fixed costs im-
plied that firms had discretion over price and product configura-
tion as well as output. As a result, marginalist economic models 
had to accommodate the possibility of strategic behavior in ways 
that classicism could not even fathom. The principal variables 
that accounted for the differences among markets were: (1) the 
number of firms and their size differences; (2) the extent of fixed 
costs, or economies of scale; (3) the degree of product differentia-
tion and the amount of mobility among differentiations; and (4) 
ease of entry. The two extreme cases provoked the least contro-
versy. In highly competitive markets with modest scale econo-
mies, easy entry, a fairly homogenous product, and typically nu-
merous firms, competition could be trusted to discipline even 
modest deviations from competitive behavior.192 The only alter-
natives open to firms were to produce all they could at the market 
price or to collude. At the other extreme, if scale economies were 
so significant that they dictated a single firm for a market, then 
monopoly plus price regulation might be in order. 
The two intermediate classes, monopolistic competition and 
structural oligopoly, were much more troublesome. The less prob-
lematic of the two was monopolistic competition, characterized by 
product differentiation and easy entry, where prices would be 
above marginal cost but workable competition could be at-
tained.193 More problematic was oligopoly, characterized by a 
small number of firms, high entry barriers, and varying degrees 
of product differentiation.194 
In the late 1930s and 1940s, Chamberlin’s monopolistic com-
petition theory swept the field of competition economics.195 How-
 
 190. See, e.g., CARL KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY 
CORPORATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AN ANTI-TRUST CASE 1–24 (1956) 
(discussing a Harvard professor’s analysis of the shoe industry). 
 191. See, e.g., SAMUEL M. LOESCHER, IMPERFECT COLLUSION IN THE CE-
MENT INDUSTRY 1–8 (1959); JESSE W. MARKHAM, COMPETITION IN THE RAYON 
INDUSTRY 1–5 (1952); JAMES M. MCKIE, TIN CANS AND TIN PLATE: A STUDY IN 
TWO RELATED MARKETS 1–9 (1959); MERTON J. PECK, COMPETITION IN THE 
ALUMINUM INDUSTRY, 1945–1958, at 1–4 (1961).  
 192. See generally CHAMBERLIN, supra note 41, at 11–22. 
 193. See generally id. at 56–70. 
 194. See id. at 30–31 (describing the basic problems facing oligopolies). 
 195. See GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND 
FREE ENTERPRISE 87–89 (1951) (discussing how textbook writers quickly in-
corporated Chamberlin’s principles). 
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ever, the policy emphasis switched away from Chamberlin’s par-
ticular model, characterized by easy entry and a fairly large 
number of firms, to oligopoly.196 The troublesome cases were not 
restaurants, where product differentiation was abundant but en-
try was easy. Rather, they were manufacturing, which was often 
characterized by differentiated products, high entry barriers, and 
sufficient scale economies to dictate a small number of firms. 
The economics of the day perceived one very important dif-
ference between monopolistic competition generally and monopo-
listic competition in oligopoly industries. In the former, ease of 
entry plus a large number of firms drove firms to innovate contin-
uously in order to reposition their products. One might conclude 
that there was too much product differentiation and too much of 
collateral outputs such as advertising. But in the long run prices 
were driven to cost. None of this was likely in a market with a 
small number of firms and high entry barriers. Joe Bain, who be-
came the most prominent spokesperson for Harvard School struc-
turalism, complained in 1950 that workable competition in oligo-
poly industries would be much more difficult to achieve than 
Clark had anticipated.197 
Harvard dominated economic thinking about competition 
policy from the 1940s through the 1970s and had a very consi-
derable influence on antitrust policy.198 Its principals were 
Chamberlin, Edward S. Mason on the Harvard economics faculty, 
and Joe S. Bain, who received his Ph.D. under Mason but who 
spent most of his career in the economics department of the Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley.199 
Already in 1937 Mason had observed that lawyers and econ-
omists used the term “monopoly” differently. For lawyers mono-
poly was identified by “restrictive or abusive practices” while 
 
 196. See id. at 92–93 (discussing the shift away from the Chamberlin model 
in the realm of public policy). 
 197. See Joe S. Bain, Workable Competition in Oligopoly: Theoretical Con-
siderations and Some Empirical Evidence, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 35, 37–38 (1950) 
(“[A]ny economist’s assessment of the workability of competition is likely to 
have a highly provisional and even personal character and is likely to rest 
heavily on the ad hoc assessment of obvious alternatives in given situations.”). 
 198. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 35–38 (discussing the in-
fluence of the Harvard school on public policy). 
 199. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Introduction to the Neal Report 
and the Crisis in Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 219, 219–22 (2009) 
(discussing Chamberlin, Mason, and Bain). 
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economists identified monopoly as market control.200 Writing a 
dozen years later and responding to John Maurice Clark’s call for 
a workable competition policy, Mason concluded that lawyers had 
largely come around to the economists’ view and increasingly 
were identifying monopoly as a structural rather than behavioral 
problem.201 
In extending Mason’s work, Bain found plenty of structural 
signs indicating that competition was not workable in concen-
trated industries: profit rates that were above benchmark normal 
returns on investment; plants that were larger than justified by 
scale economies; chronic excess capacity; and lags in adoption of 
cost-reducing technology. Bain stated, “A market could be consi-
dered a case of unworkable competition if it had an extremely bad 
rating in any direction or moderately bad or suspicious ratings in 
several.”202 Further: 
[W]hatever the degree of association within oligopolies between com-
petitive behavior and results, it seems quite likely that such behavior 
may be in turn either influenced or determined by certain characte-
ristics of the underlying market structure. If so, a demonstrated asso-
ciation between market structure and results would establish the 
more fundamental determinants of workability of competition (and, 
also, determinants more easily influenced by conventional public poli-
cy measures).203 
Bain was very critical of those who believed that the rela-
tionship between structure and performance was “indetermi-
nate.”204 He thought it possible to “arrive at hypotheses concern-
ing the systematic association of oligopolistic market structure 
and results.”205 Bain then proposed a research agenda that would 
relate market structure to such things as the likelihood and suc-
cess of collusion, price-cost margins, and innovation rates. Most 
importantly, he believed, the height of entry barriers into concen-
trated markets determined performance. In Bain’s later work en-
try barriers emerged as the single most decisive determinant of 
price and output in concentrated industries. His own popular text 
 
 200. See Edward S. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 
34, 43 (1937) (“By monopoly . . . the courts did not mean control of the market 
but restriction of competition.”). 
 201. See Edward S. Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in 
the United States, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1271–76 (1949) (discussing how mo-
nopoly in the legal sense has moved towards a workable competition model). 
 202. Bain, supra note 197, at 37–38. 
 203. Id. at 38. 
 204. See id. at 39. 
 205. Id. 
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on industrial organization economics furnished the theoretical 
basis for that research agenda.206 
A. THE STRUCTURE-CONDUCT-PERFORMANCE (S-C-P) 
PARADIGM 
The Mason/Bain paradigm for industrial competition consti-
tuted a formal attempt to relate an industry’s structure to its per-
formance, with performance referring to degree of competitive-
ness. The powerful evaluation tool that resulted, is known today 
as the structure-conduct-performance, or S-C-P, paradigm. Dur-
ing its heyday, the S-C-P paradigm was subjected to more empir-
ical testing than any economic model in history.207 
The theory behind the S-C-P paradigm was simple enough. 
Using Cournot-style analysis of profit-maximizing behavior in 
concentrated markets, one could relate industry performance to 
structure, in particular the number of firms and the height of en-
try barriers.208 More generally, under the paradigm, industry 
structure was thought to determine conduct.209 For example, 
firms in concentrated industries with high fixed costs could not 
avoid comparing their prices and determining whether to match 
or undercut their rivals, nor could they avoid deciding whether a 
new product configuration in a market was necessary to their 
own success or how others might respond. This conduct was in 
turn thought to dictate performance.210 Given an expression in 
which structure entails conduct and conduct entails performance, 
conduct itself dropped out as a variable of interest. One could 
predict performance simply by knowing something about struc-
ture. 
 
 206. See JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER 
AND CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 21–24 (1956) (discuss-
ing the value of a condition of entry to a firm); JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL OR-
GANIZATION 174 (1959) [hereinafter BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION] (dis-
cussing how the ability of a few firms to charge higher prices was the “essence 
of any barrier to entry”). See generally Joe S. Bain, Conditions of Entry and the 
Emergence of Monopoly, in MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION AND THEIR REGULA-
TION 215, 219–26 (Edward H. Chamberlin ed., 1954) [hereinafter Bain, Condi-
tions of Entry] (discussing condition of entry and its effect on the tendencies of 
monopoly). 
 207. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 199, at 219–22 (discussing the 
S-C-P paradigm, its history, and its demise in the wake of the publication of 
the Neal and Stigler Reports). 
 208. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 36 (discussing the S-C-P paradigm). 
 209. See id. (“[T]he [S-C-P] paradigm held that a given market structure 
dictated certain types of conduct . . . .”). 
 210. See id.  
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In the 1950s the S-C-P paradigm emerged as the most ele-
gant and comprehensive model of industry competition in the 
marginalist era.211 Its reductionism contributed to its explanato-
ry power. Conduct was thought to be difficult to assess, largely 
because for most conduct numerous alternative explanations, 
both anticompetitive and pro-competitive, were possible. A large 
firm’s actions intended to increase its own sales were presump-
tively competitive, while actions intended to deny sales to rivals 
might be thought presumptively anticompetitive. But how does 
one tell the difference in a concentrated market where most of a 
firm’s output increases come at the expense of a rival? The S-C-P 
paradigm promised economists, and thus antitrust policymakers, 
a way of addressing these problems without troubling themselves 
about the manifold ambiguities inherent in analyzing conduct. 
Bolstering Bain’s commitment to using the S-C-P paradigm 
as a policy tool, was his belief that industrial concentration in 
America was excessive. He concluded that firms were larger than 
necessary to attain available efficiencies.212 Bain argued that the 
long-run average cost curve of most firms had a very large flat 
bottom. In order to be profitable a firm must recover its long-run 
costs, and the bottom of the curve represents the place where unit 
costs were lowest—that is, where the firm was producing most 
efficiently. A flat bottom entailed that once a firm had attained 
minimum efficient scale it could continue to grow larger without 
acquiring any inefficiencies from larger size. As a result, while a 
market in which minimum efficient scale was, say, a ten percent 
market share could accommodate ten efficient firms, such a mar-
ket might in fact have only three or four firms.213 In the presence 
of high entry barriers, which Bain tended to find readily, this 
theory had strong implications for antitrust policy. It suggested 
that there was a concentration “ratchet” in the sense that even 
after a firm attained all scale economies, nothing kept it from 
growing larger still, but there was no reason to expect it to be-
come smaller. As a result, industrial concentration would tend to 
increase.214 This would of course be exacerbated by a lax merger 
 
 211. See Hovenkamp, supra note 199, at 219. 
 212. See BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 206, at 358 (noting 
that there is “significant incidence” in the manufacturing industries where 
firms are “unnecessarily large”). 
 213. See id. at 152–55 (noting that firms in diseconomies of scale often 
have ranges above the minimum optimal scale). 
 214. Bain stated: 
If . . . diseconomies of large scale are not important over a wide range, 
so that any firm can attain optimal efficiency either at a very small 
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policy that permitted firms to grow by acquisition as well as in-
ternal expansion. 
Significantly, as concentration increased and the number of 
firms in an industry declined, productive efficiency would not di-
minish. Anticompetitive behavior would increase, however, as the 
firms acquired greater incentives to behave oligopolistically or 
collude. Or to say it differently, once a firm grew large enough to 
attain all production economies it could not make further profits 
by reducing its costs. However, it could profit by increasing pric-
es, which would occur as the market became more oligopolistic.215 
The idea that firms were much larger than they needed to be to 
attain all available scale economies played an important role in 
the congressional hearings that led to the 1950 Celler-Kefauver 
amendments to the anti-merger provision, section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act.216 Bain believed that overall, American industry exhi-
bited a trend toward growing concentration217—a theme that was 
reflected in subsequent merger decisions in the Supreme Court, 
such as Brown Shoe.218 Indeed, in 1960s-era merger policy a 
“trend toward concentration” became a shortcut that the Su-
preme Court used to condemn mergers without detailed inquiry 
into market structure or anticompetitive effects.219 
 
scale or up to a much larger scale, the number of firms is no longer 
forced to remain large, since firms may grow or combine without loss 
of efficiency until their sizes are large and their number few. Thereu-
pon, the force of inter-firm competition may be restricted to permit 
periodic elevation of price above minimal average cost, and existing 
firms may be permitted or induced to attain inefficiently large 
scales . . . . 
Id. at 160. 
 215. See id. at 170 (noting how a price “substantially in excess of cost” is 
much easier to attain in oligopolistic industries). 
 216. See S. REP. No. 81-1775, at 3 (2d Sess. 1950). 
 217. See BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 206, at 189 (provid-
ing an overview of business concentration rates from the time of the Civil War 
forward). 
 218. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 346 (1962) (hold-
ing that the merger of a shoe manufacturer and retailer would substantially 
lessen competition in the retail shoe sales sector). 
 219. See, e.g., United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963). 
[I]ntense congressional concern with the trend toward concentration 
warrants dispensing, in certain cases, with elaborate proof of market 
structure, market behavior, or probable anticompetitive effects. Spe-
cifically, we think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an 
undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a sig-
nificant increase in the concentration of firms in that market is so in-
herently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be en-
joined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is 
not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.  
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Further, Bain argued, vertical integration could exacerbate 
the tendency toward concentration by linking vertically related 
firms with differential scales.220 Bain gave the example of vertical 
integration of automobile production and automobile assembly.221 
Suppose that production was subject to significant scale econo-
mies and required a sixteen percent market share for maximum 
efficiency.222 Assembly of manufactured parts, however, took 
place at a much smaller scale and required a market share of on-
ly two percent. But by integrating manufacturing and assembly, 
particularly by making the parts specific to the design, the verti-
cally integrated automobile manufacturer effectively gave assem-
bly a minimum efficient scale of sixteen percent as well.223 In 
Bain’s terminology the “critical” minimum scale for a vertically 
integrated firm was always the stage with the largest minimum 
efficient market share.224 
Bain also believed that product differentiation was a much 
less benign phenomenon in oligopoly than in Chamberlin’s model 
of monopolistic competition. The model of monopolistic competi-
tion assumed easy entry. As a result, while prices were above 
marginal cost, they were always driven to total cost over the long 
run. Bain regarded product differentiation as an affirmative bar-
rier to entry in concentrated markets. Product differentiation in-
herently favored established firms because it induced consumer 
brand preferences, thus giving incumbent firms an advantage 
over new entrants.225 In addition, product-differentiated markets 
also tended to have more patent protection for existing designs 
and tended to have more regimented distribution systems.226 
Bain concluded that high product differentiation was one of the 
factors predisposing an industry towards higher seller concentra-
 
Id. at 363. See also United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277 
(1966) (“The facts of this case present exactly the threatening trend toward 
concentration which Congress wanted to halt.”); Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 316, 
322–23 (relying on a trend toward concentration to justify condemning hori-
zontal aspects of the merger); id. at 332 (relying on a trend toward vertical in-
tegration as a rationale for condemning vertical aspects).  
 220. See BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 206, at 358 (discus-
sing vertical integration in relation to firms which are “unnecessarily large”). 
 221. See id. 
 222. See id. at 158. 
 223. See id. 
 224. See id. at 159 (“The critical optimal scale is the largest . . . .”). 
 225. See id. at 239 (“[E]stablished firms may enjoy a product-
differentiation advantage over potential entrants, because of the preference of 
buyers for established firms and products when compared with new ones.”). 
 226. See id. at 240 (discussing patent protection as a source of product-
differentiation barrier). 
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tion and higher accounting profits.227 This group of observations 
led Bain to conclude that prices tended to be higher in markets as 
the degree of product differentiation was greater. 
In contrast to these structural manifestations of inadequate 
competition, Bain found conduct to be extraordinarily difficult to 
assess. He concluded that “[w]e eschew, therefore, any general at-
tempt to state an operational criterion of the conduct conditions 
of workable competition, and adhere in the main to a suggestion 
only of structural conditions.”228 Beginning with this premise, 
Bain attacked the conduct orientation of section 2 of the Sherman 
Act. Under the statute, monopoly could be “attacked in the main 
only indirectly through assault on the predatory or exclusionary 
actions of firms, and not directly as a structural phenomenon 
with certain undesirable consequences for market perfor-
mance.”229 The result was “lengthy and expensive” and largely 
indeterminate litigation, whose poor results were exacerbated by 
the fact that the courts were usually “unwilling to remedy illegal 
monopolization by requiring structural changes through such de-
vices as dissolution or dismemberment of offending firms. Thus, 
those revisions of market structure which might most strongly 
assure a more competitive performance typically are not im-
posed . . . .”230 
B. THE S-C-P PARADIGM AND THE COURTS 
Under the influence of the S-C-P paradigm, the emergent 
view came to be that antitrust policy prior to World War II had 
been much too tolerant of anticompetitive industrial structures. 
For example, Vanderbilt economist George W. Stocking faulted 
the Supreme Court for an excessive emphasis on “intent and con-
duct,” which he believed had served to undermine several gov-
ernment cases against dominant firms.231 He was particularly 
 
 227. See id. at 236 (“[G]reat product differentiation is evidently one of sev-
eral forces predisposing toward high seller concentration.”); see also id. at 416 
(finding that high profit rates are correlated with high product differentiation, 
tending “to cast a shadow of doubt on frequently repeated assertions that 
strong product differentiation is conducive to a more workable competition”). 
 228. Id. at 427.  
 229. Id. at 607. 
 230. Id. at 608. 
 231. George W. Stocking, The Rule of Reason, Workable Competition, and 
Monopoly, 64 YALE L.J. 1107, 1124 (1955) (citing United States v. Winslow, 
195 F. 578 (D. Mass. 1912), aff’d, 227 U.S. 202 (1913); United States v. Am. 
Can Co., 230 F. 859 (D. Md. 1916), appeal dismissed, 256 U.S. 706 (1921); 
United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); United States v. Int’l 
Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927)). Stocking was best known for his coau-
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harsh in his treatment of the 1920 United States Steel decision, 
which he believed “emasculated” the Sherman Act by refusing to 
condemn an industrial combination unless it resulted in “com-
plete” monopoly.232 
The implications of the S-C-P paradigm on postwar antitrust 
policy were far-reaching. In merger law, the paradigm entailed 
that mergers could be analyzed simply by determining the mar-
ket shares of the firms involved. This view came to be accepted by 
the Supreme Court233 and was expressly incorporated into guide-
lines for assessing the legality of mergers that the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Justice Department issued in 1968, when Harvard-
trained economist Donald F. Turner was its head.234 Mainly, 
these guidelines created a sliding scale of enforcement policy de-
pending on the market shares of the firms and the number of 
firms in the market. The Supreme Court’s Philadelphia Bank de-
cision created a virtual per se rule that linked merger legality to 
the market shares of the merging firms.235 
In monopolization law, the S-C-P paradigm shifted the focus 
of analysis away from conduct, which had dominated the law in 
the first half of the century,236 and toward structure. In the im-
 
thored book GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND 
FREE ENTERPRISE (1951). 
 232. Stocking, supra note 231, at 1125. 
 233. See, e.g., United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277−78 
(1966); United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364 (1963); Brown 
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343 (1962). See also Stocking, supra 
note 231, at 1110−13 (advocating the S-C-P paradigm and discussing it as a 
standard applied in several major Supreme Court antitrust decisions). 
 234. The guidelines are still available on the Department of Justice’s Anti-
trust Division website. See Merger Guidelines–1968, 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 
¶ 13,101, at 20,521 (1988), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/ 
11247.pdf. Turner received his Ph.D. from Harvard under Mason in 1947, and 
then graduated from Yale Law School in 1950. He became head of the Anti-
trust Division in 1965, during the Johnson administration. The 1968 Guide-
lines were issued on his last day in office as Assistant Attorney General for 
Antitrust. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Merger Guidelines of the U.S. De-
partment of Justice—In Perspective, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11257 
.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2009). 
 235. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 364. 
 236. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 86 (1911) 
(holding that the Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890 prohibits all contracts and 
combinations which amount to an unreasonable or undue restraint of trade in 
interstate commerce); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181–83 
(1911) (holding that the defendant’s “acts, contracts, agreements, [and] combi-
nations” were of “such an unusual and wrongful character as to bring them 
within the prohibitions of the law”); Am. Can Co., 230 F., at 902 (D. Md. 1916) 
(arguing that the defendant, in its conduct, had for some time used its poten-
tially harmful power for “weal rather than woe”). 
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portant Alcoa237 and United Shoe Machinery238 decisions, the 
courts condemned monopolists on the basis of minimal conduct 
requirements when significant market power was clear.239 In-
deed, the prominent judges in both decisions flirted briefly with 
the idea that the mere existence of monopoly was sufficient to 
warrant enforced dissolution.240 Writing in 1956, Turner con-
cluded that “[s]uch postwar decisions as Alcoa perceptibly de-
creased the law’s requirement of bad conduct, perceptibly in-
creased its attention to power, and substantially increased the 
volume of discussion as to which course the law had best pur-
sue.”241 In any event, he concluded, “Alcoa clearly consigned the 
abuse theory of monopolization to limbo.”242 
In 1959, while still a law professor, Turner and his coauthor 
Carl Kaysen proposed that the government be permitted to break 
up monopolies without any proof of anticompetitive conduct, but 
based on structural criteria alone.243 That proposal was even ex-
tended to durable oligopolies.244 Twenty years later, in 1978, 
Turner and his new coauthor and former student Phillip E. Aree-
da renewed the proposal that the government (but not private 
plaintiffs) be permitted to bring dissolution decrees against dura-
ble monopolists.245 While the courts never adopted that position, 
both the government and the courts accepted definitions of the 
monopolization offense that required much less in the way of 
 
 237. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 
1945). 
 238. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. 
Mass. 1953). 
 239. Id. at 297–98; Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 428; see also United States v. Grin-
nell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966) (condemning a series of acquisitions as 
unlawful monopolization). 
 240. United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 348 (discussing but ultimately rejecting 
the possibility of dissolution as a remedy); Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 428. 
 241. Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARV. 
L. REV. 281, 281–82 (1956). 
 242. Id. at 292. 
 243. CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOM-
IC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 46, 111–19 (1959). 
 244. See id. at 111; Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under 
the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. 
REV. 655, 656 (1962). 
 245. 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶¶ 614–23 
(1978). The present author has preserved the proposal, largely for its historical 
value, in 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶¶ 630–38 (3d 
ed. 2008). 
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harmful conduct than earlier cases had found, provided that the 
firm was properly found to be a structural monopolist. In sum, 
the focus of monopolization law moved greatly from monopoly 
conduct to monopoly market structure. In true Harvard School 
fashion, evidence of subjective intent became formally irrele-
vant.246 
The economists advocating the S-C-P paradigm and the 
courts worked in tandem. Which one most influenced the other is 
difficult to say. For example, the S-C-P paradigm matured in the 
economics literature in the 1950s. However, the Alcoa decision 
condemning the aluminum monopoly is almost pure structural-
ism, but was written nearly a decade earlier.247 Industrial struc-
ture was first and foremost on the minds of Congress when it 
enacted the Cellar-Kefauver amendments to the merger law in 
1950.248 The concerns that Bain expressed about a trend toward 
increased industrial concentration showed up clearly in that sta-
tute’s legislative history.249 Indeed, they were a principal subject 
of a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) study in 1948 that ex-
pressed alarm at the trend toward concentration: 
No great stretch of the imagination is required to foresee that if noth-
ing is done to check the growth in concentration, either the giant cor-
porations will ultimately take over the country, or the Government 
will be impelled to step in and impose some form of direct regulation 
in the public interest.250 
The FTC’s conclusions in part reflected views that stretched 
back to at least 1932, when Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. 
Means criticized what they saw as rising concentration in their 
 
 246. See, e.g., Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945) (“We disregard any 
question of ‘intent.’”). On the other side, in the du Pont (Cellophane) decision 
the Supreme Court found substitutes for the defendant’s product and con-
cluded that sufficient power was lacking. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956); see also Turner, supra note 244, at 
281–82 (critiquing the “purpose and intent” approach). 
 247. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 431. 
 248. See EDWARD S. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONO-
POLY PROBLEM 371–81 (1957); Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and 
the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 234–36 (1960). 
 249. See Amending Sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act: Hearings on H.R. 
515 Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. 7 
(1947) (statement of Kefauver that “[the] increased concentration of economic 
power is dooming free enterprise”); see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (describing Congress’s concern with “the protection of 
competition, not competitors, and its desire to restrain mergers only to the ex-
tent that such combinations may tend to lessen competition”). 
 250. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE MERGER MOVEMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT 
68 (1948). The FTC’s conclusions were in fact strongly contested by econo-
mists. On this debate, see Bok, supra note 248, at 234–35. 
  
358 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [94:311 
 
famous book The Modern Corporation and Private Property.251 
They spoke of the “centripetal attraction which draws wealth to-
gether into aggregations of constantly increasing size,” and 
warned that “the trend is apparent” and “no limit is as yet in 
sight.”252 The 1950 legislation followed a string of proposals in 
Congress to stop further concentration.253 To be sure, these earli-
er proposals were not based on the full-blown S-C-P paradigm. 
For the most part, they did not even share the basic concerns of 
the structuralist economists about reduced output and higher 
prices in concentrated industries. The earlier concerns were ad-
dressed mainly to aggregations of wealth or power as such, and 
the economics that drove them was as much institutionalism as 
neoclassicism.254 But whatever the source, the impetus for an an-
titrust policy concerned with industrial concentration was clear. 
The S-C-P views on vertical integration were also reflected in 
numerous antitrust decisions in the 1950s and 1960s that were 
very harsh toward vertical expansion by virtually any means, in-
cluding long-term contractual arrangements.255 This suspicion of 
 
 251. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORA-
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 252. Id. at 18. 
 253. See Note, Corporate Consolidation and the Concentration of Economic 
Power: Proposals for Revitalization of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 57 YALE 
L.J. 613, 620–26 (1948) (summarizing these proposals). 
 254. Derek Bok’s concluded: 
To anyone used to the preoccupation of professors and administrators 
with the economic consequences of monopoly power, the curious as-
pect of the debates is the paucity of remarks having to do with the ef-
fects of concentration on prices, innovation, distribution, and efficien-
cy. To be sure, there were allusions to the need for preserving 
competition. But competition appeared to possess a strong socio-
political connotation which centered on the virtues of the small entre-
preneur to an extent seldom duplicated in economic literature. 
Bok, supra note 248, at 236–37; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Derek Bok and 
the Merger of Law and Economics, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 515, 516 (1988). 
 255. E.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962) (not-
ing that not all vertical mergers are forbidden, only those whose effect is to 
“substantially . . . lessen competition, or . . . tend to create a monopoly”); Unit-
ed States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 174 (1948) (finding that vertic-
al merger “runs afoul of the Sherman Act if it was a calculated scheme to gain 
control over an appreciable segment of the market and to restrain or suppress 
competition, rather than an expansion to meet legitimate business needs”); 
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947) (finding that illegal 
restraint of trade “may result as readily from a conspiracy among those who 
are affiliated or integrated under common ownership as from a conspiracy 
among those who are otherwise independent”). But see United States v. Co-
lumbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 507–10 (1948) (refusing to condemn vertical 
integration that left sufficient nonintegrated parties in the market). This case 
was part of the motivation for Congress to pass the 1950 amendments. 
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vertical integration was also reflected in congressional amend-
ments to the merger law in 1950 that extended its coverage to 
vertical mergers—that is, mergers between a customer and a 
supplier. It also showed up in increasingly hostile attitudes to-
ward long-term vertical contracts that were thought either to lim-
it dealer freedom or to exclude rivals.256 
VI.  THE S-C-P PARADIGM IN DECLINE   
The dominant theme guiding antitrust policy under the S-C-
P paradigm was that competition policy should eliminate or at 
least reduce the amount of market power in the economy. Fur-
ther, outside of monopolized industries the principal source of 
market power was thought to be oligopoly, where the threats 
were either Cournot-style behavior or express collusion.257 
By contrast, the guiding principle of the Chicago School criti-
que of the S-C-P paradigm was that market power is not inhe-
rently a bad thing. Indeed, often market power as well as high 
concentration result from efficiency. To illustrate, suppose that 
widgets are made in a moderately competitive market at a cost of 
three dollars. If I develop a cost-reducing technology or process 
that reduces my costs to two dollars but continue to sell my wid-
gets at the market price, I will have high margins between my 
prices and costs—something that the prevailing measures would 
have identified as market power, as would accounting measures 
of profits.258 Problematically, however, if I take advantage of my 
cost-reducing technology to cut the widget price below three dol-
lars, then I will be excluding my rivals. So, the critique ran, many 
of the phenomena that the S-C-P paradigm had identified as an-
ticompetitive market “foreclosure,” or the creation of barriers to 
entry, were nothing more than economic efficiency. 
 
 256. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967) 
(finding vertical territorial restraints to be per se unlawful); Simpson v. Union 
Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 20–21 (1964) (holding that resale price maintenance en-
forced through consignment contracts imposed on dealers to be per se unlaw-
ful); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949) (condemning 
exclusive dealing on relatively low market shares where other oil refineries 
were doing the same thing); Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 
(1947) (tying of a staple commodity is unlawful even in the absence of proof of 
serious market power).  
 257. See, e.g., KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 243, at 82. 
 258. For example, the Lerner Index, developed in the 1930s, expressed 
market power as a relationship between price and marginal cost. See HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE § 3.1 (3d ed. 2005); Abba Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the 
Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 REV. ECON. STUD. 157, 169 (1934). 
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A. THE CHICAGO SCHOOL REJECTION OF THE S-C-P PARADIGM 
The Chicago School launched a frontal attack on the S-C-P 
paradigm’s identification of industrial concentration as an inhe-
rent evil.259 The most likely cause of industrial concentration, 
Chicago economists argued, was economies of scale.260 Further, 
the engineering studies of production that S-C-P economists had 
used to measure economies of scale vastly understated them.261 
The fairly rigid Cournot-based and monopolistic theories that the 
S-C-P paradigm adopted to account for behavior in concentrated 
markets considerably understated the ingenuity of firms in find-
ing ways to compete.262 Or to state it more technically, the S-C-P 
paradigm tended to view oligopoly as a structural problem in the 
Cournot sense, which rather strictly related performance to the 
number of firms in a market and their size distribution.263 In con-
trast, the Chicago School tended to look at concentrated indus-
tries as presenting a problem in price theory,264 in which each 
market participant weighed the net effects of various actions and 
anticipated responses.265 To be sure, the number of firms was not 
unimportant—at least at very low levels—but it was hardly deci-
 
 259. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 31–42 (discussing the initial differ-
ences and subsequent coalescence of the two schools). See generally NEIL DUX-
BURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 330–48 (1995) (recounting the 
Chicago School’s development). Many members of the Chicago School began in 
the Harvard camp and migrated toward the Chicago position. See HOVEN-
KAMP, supra note 2, at 319 n.14; GEORGE J. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNRE-
GULATED ECONOMIST 97–100 (1988); Posner, supra note 157, at 933–35. See 
generally William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competi-
tion Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 
2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (discussing the intermingling of economic theories 
between the two schools). At the same time, however, the Harvard School 
largely abandoned the S-C-P paradigm. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 35–
38. Government officials eventually solicited these academic theories to help 
develop antitrust policy. See Hovenkamp, supra note 199, at 217–18. 
 260. See Sam Peltzman, The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentra-
tion, 20 J.L. & ECON. 229, 229 (1977) (“[M]arket concentration and industry 
profitability are positively correlated.”). 
 261. See generally id. at 229–30 (examining market structure and pricing); 
Harold Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CON-
CENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 164 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974) 
(comparing different methods of analyzing industrial concentration). 
 262. Cf. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 35–37 (explaining Cournot’s theory 
and the S-C-P paradigm).  
 263. See id.  
 264. See Posner, supra note 157, at 931–32. 
 265. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 
(1964), reprinted in GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 39–
63 (1968) (discussing the effects of collusion and price-cutting); Posner, supra 
note 157, at 931–32. 
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sive.266 Collusion was often a possibility. The price theory pers-
pective revealed the extent to which a firm’s strategies depended 
not only on the number of firms, but also on such things as prod-
uct differentiation and the amount of price information available 
in the market. The Chicago theory also rejected the purely struc-
turalist notion that the oligopoly demand curve contained a 
“kink” that inclined fellow oligopolists to follow a price increase 
but not a price cut.267 Indeed, in orthodox Chicago folklore the 
“kinky demand curve” became something of a joke about structu-
ralism run amuck.268 
The Chicago School also rejected the Bainian theory of entry 
barriers,269 which defined them as any market factor that ex-
cluded entry while the firms already in the market were earning 
returns above the competitive level.270 Under this definition both 
scale economies and product differentiation were entry barriers, 
because each gave incumbent firms advantages over new en-
trants.271 The Chicago view was that this definition penalized 
firms for being innovative and efficient, particularly if high entry 
barriers were used as a justification for government interven-
tion.272 Rather, George J. Stigler argued, an entry barrier must 
be some factor that new rivals must overcome and that estab-
lished firms did not need to overcome when they entered the 
market.273 
 
 266. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 32 (discussing the Chicago view-
point on the relationship between effective competition and the number of 
firms involved).  
 267. Cf. George J. Stigler, The Kinky Oligopoly Demand and Rigid Prices, 
55 J. POL. ECON. 432, 434–48 (1947) (examining the concept of the kinky de-
mand curve). The notion of the kinky demand curve was formulated by Har-
vard professor Paul Sweezy and Oxford economists Robert L. Hall and Charles 
J. Hitch. Id. at 432; see R.L. Hall & C.J. Hitch, Price Theory and Business Be-
haviour, 2 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 12, 12–20 (1939); Paul M. Sweezy, Demand 
Under Conditions of Oligopoly, 47 J. POL. ECON. 568, 570–75 (1939). 
 268. See generally George J. Stigler, The Literature of Economics: The Case 
of the Kinked Oligopoly Demand Curve, 16 ECON. INQUIRY 185, 188–94 (1978) 
(discussing the history of the kinky demand curve from the perspective of a 
biased participant).  
 269. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 102–03 (explaining Stigler’s alterna-
tive definition of barriers to entry).  
 270. See Bain, Conditions of Entry, supra note 206, at 4–5 (defining condi-
tions of entry). 
 271. See id. at 14 (discussing the attributes of heightened conditions of en-
try).  
 272. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 33 (noting the Chicago School’s dis-
approval of government intervention in markets).  
 273. See Stigler, supra note 265, at 67. Antitrust policy today continues to 
use mainly the Bainian definition of barriers to entry. See 2B PHILLIP E. 
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The twin pillars of Chicago School revisionism were first, 
that attainment of economies of scale required firms much larger 
than Bain had supposed; and second, that firms in concentrated 
markets behave much more competitively than Chamberlin, Ma-
son, Bain, Kaysen, or Turner had supposed—at least down to the 
point at which the market contains only three or four firms.274 
B. REJECTION OF THE LEVERAGING THEORY OF MONOPOLY 
POWER 
There were other important critiques as well. One of the 
most important was the 1950s critique of the “migration” or “do-
mino” theory of monopoly, which was that a monopolist could use 
monopoly power in one market to leverage a second monopoly 
somewhere else.275 The theory was thoroughly embraced by the 
Supreme Court.276 Some Chicago School critics ascribed the 
theory to the Harvard School and the S-C-P paradigm, although 
without good foundation.277 
The leveraging theory of monopoly had many manifestations, 
but they all involved the dominant firm’s related operations in 
two different markets.278 If the markets were vertically related, 
then vertical integration became the problem;279 however, lever-
aging applied in other pairings of markets as well. The thinking 
was that a firm that operated in two or more markets—and had 
market power in one of them—might use that power to create a 
second monopoly or reap an unfair competitive advantage in the 
second market.280 The theory showed up in antitrust law in the 
 
AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 420(a) (3d ed. 2007). 
 274. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and 
Public Policy, 16 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1973) (concluding that industrial concen-
tration largely results from changing cost conditions, rather than heightened 
entry barriers); Wesley J. Liebeler, Market Power and Competitive Superiority 
in Concentrated Industries, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1231, 1232–34 (1978) (arguing 
against restrictions on competitive superiority). 
 275. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 297 (applying the leverage 
theory to the computer industry).  
 276. See id. at 201 (noting the Court’s articulation of the leverage theory). 
 277. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 157, at 929 (characterizing various mem-
bers of the Harvard School, including Donald Turner, as embracing the leve-
rage theory). In fact, Turner’s concern is focused on rivals in the tied product 
markets, rather than theories of multiple monopoly profits. See Donald F. 
Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 
HARV. L. REV. 50, 60–62, 63 n.42 (1958). 
 278. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 201 (discussing the orthodox leve-
rage theory).  
 279. See id. at 33 (discussing leverage theory and vertical integration). 
 280. See id. at 201. 
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1911 Standard Oil case, in the claim that Rockefeller’s Standard 
Oil Company continuously enlarged its monopoly by using mono-
poly profits in towns where it was already dominant in order to 
finance predatory pricing in towns where it had not yet attained 
such power.281 That theory was embraced by Congress in 1914, 
when the original section 2 of the Clayton Act made it unlawful 
for a firm to charge a low price in a targeted community while 
selling similar goods at a higher price elsewhere.282 Another ma-
nifestation of monopoly leveraging was the notion that a firm 
that operated in many markets but had a monopoly in only a few 
might use multimarket contracting to leverage additional advan-
tage in its non-monopoly markets.283 This view was advocated by 
the Antitrust Division284 and embraced by the Supreme Court in 
its 1948 Griffith decision, which condemned a large motion pic-
ture exhibitor’s practice of negotiating film contracts for all of its 
theaters together, thus obtaining “unfair” advantages in towns 
where it lacked power.285 
Undoubtedly the most important debate over leveraging oc-
curred in the law of tying arrangements,286 although the origins 
 
 281. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31–44 (1911) (ana-
lyzing allegations against Standard Oil). For the Chicago School critique, see 
John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. 
& ECON. 137, 137–43 (1958), which disputes the theory that Standard Oil even 
engaged in predatory pricing. See generally James May, The Story of Standard 
Oil Co. v. United States, in ANTITRUST STORIES, supra note 181, at 7 (detail-
ing the Standard Oil litigation). McGee’s theory itself is subject to some criti-
cism. See James A. Dalton & Louis Esposito, Predatory Price Cutting and 
Standard Oil: A Re-examination of the Trial Record, 22 RES. L. & ECON. 155, 
156–58 (2007) (reexamining the trial record and finding numerous instances of 
predation, in conflict with McGee’s conclusions); Elizabeth Granitz & Benja-
min Klein, Monopolization by “Raising Rivals’ Costs”: The Standard Oil Case, 
39 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3–6 (1996) (using exclusionary contracts to impose higher 
costs); cf. RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. 113–
17, 144–47, 202–25, 251–58 (1998) (finding anticompetitive agreements with 
railroads). The leverage theory of predatory pricing antedates the passage of 
the Sherman Act. See F.J. Stimson, “Trusts,” 1 HARV. L. REV. 132, 134 (1887) 
(arguing that monopoly prices in monopoly towns could subsidize predatory 
pricing in competitive towns, creating a monopoly in them as well). 
 282. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730, 730–31 (1914) (current ver-
sion at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2006)); cf. 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVEN-
KAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 745 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing price predation and the 
Robinson-Patman Act). 
 283. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 245, ¶ 652(a). 
 284. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 102–04 (1948).  
 285. See id. at 109.  
 286. Cf. Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the 
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2009) (manu-
script at 1–3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1345239) (arguing against 
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long antedate the antitrust laws.287 The idea was that by tying 
separate goods or transactions together the owner of a monopoly 
could obtain multiple sets of monopoly markups.288 The idea ori-
ginated in patent law in response to attempts by patentees to im-
pose post-sale restraints on patented articles.289 The Supreme 
Court responded with the “first sale” doctrine, which holds that 
once a patented article is sold, the patentee loses all control over 
it and cannot impose further restrictions or collect additional 
royalties on downstream sales.290 Speaking through Chief Justice 
Taney, the Supreme Court embraced the doctrine in its first 
Bloomer decision in 1852.291 In litigation involving the same pa-
tent a decade later, the Court elaborated, stating that patentees 
“are entitled to but one royalty for a patented machine.”292 As a 
result, when the patentee has sold the patented article he has 
“parted with his monopoly, and ceased to have any interest what-
ever in the machine.”293 Justice Brandeis picked this idea up 
eighty years later in the Carbice decision, which found unlawful 
patent “misuse” in a patentee’s contractual requirement that 
purchasers of its patented ice box purchase only its own dry ice, 
which was the refrigerant.294 This arrangement, Brandeis opined, 
 
the leverage critique and concluding that many ties are anticompetitive); Her-
bert Hovenkamp, The Obama Administration and § 2 of the Sherman Act, 90 
B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 10), available at 
http://www.bu.edu/law/communications/documents/BrodleySymp 
Hovenkamp.pdf (showing that most price discrimination ties benefit consum-
ers). 
 287. See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Prob-
lem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 30 (1957) (“The relationship of tying to creation of mono-
poly—the leverage problem—had been faced by courts . . . before the passage 
of the Clayton Act.”). 
 288. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 201. 
 289. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 287, at 30 (citing several pertinent cas-
es).  
 290. See, e.g., Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852) 
(“And when the machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer 
within the limits of the monopoly.”).  
 291. See id. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine in Quanta Com-
puter, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008). See generally Chris-
tina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, The Evolution of IP/Competition Poli-
cy: The First Sale Rule and Vertical Restraints, in CREATION WITHOUT 
RESTRAINT: COMPETITION POLICY IN INNOVATION INTENSIVE MARKETS (forth-
coming 2010, on file with author) (examining the historical development of the 
first sale doctrine and its relationship with competition policy). 
 292. See Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 340, 350 (1863). 
 293. Id.  
 294. See Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 29–32 
(1931). 
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enabled the patent owner to “derive its profit, not from the inven-
tion on which the law gives it a monopoly, but from the unpa-
tented supplies with which it is used.”295 If a monopoly could be 
contractually expanded in this way a patentee “might conceivably 
monopolize the commerce in a large part of unpatented materials 
used in its manufacture. The owner of a patent for a machine 
might thereby secure a partial monopoly on the unpatented sup-
plies consumed in its operation.”296 
The first critique of this theory did not come from the Chica-
go School at all, but rather from Myron W. Watkins, a professor 
at New York University, who observed that a monopolist could 
charge a high price for the second product only by offering a com-
pensating price reduction in the first product.297 That is, a mono-
poly creates the opportunity for a single monopoly markup, and a 
buyer will simply attribute a price increase in a tied product to 
the monopoly product itself.298 The critique was famously elabo-
rated upon by Ward Bowman in 1957,299 and since that time has 
been considered a core principle of the Chicago School critique of 
the Harvard School.300 
The leverage theory was clearly part of the economic folklore 
of the Supreme Court, and it accounts for a good deal of the 
Court’s hostility toward a variety of practices.301 Among these 
were the per se antitrust rule against tying arrangements, devel-
oped in the 1940s and 1950s.302 The leverage theory also accounts 
for much of the Supreme Court’s hostility toward vertical integra-
 
 295. Id. at 31–32 (quoting Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film 
Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917)). 
 296. Id. at 32. 
 297. Cf. MYRON W. WATKINS, PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE PRAC-
TICES IN BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 221 (3d ed. 1940) (noting that tied products 
subject to free competition “would not normally be profitable”).  
 298. See id. at 220 (arguing that price increases may be justified by the 
“close technical interrelationship between the two articles or machines”).  
 299. See generally Bowman, supra note 287, at 19–36 (analyzing the ratio-
nales for tying). 
 300. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 157, at 925–26 (listing explosion of the 
leverage theory for tying as the first hallmark of the Chicago approach to anti-
trust theory). 
 301. Cf. 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶¶ 1700–01 (2d ed. 2004) (noting the presence of leveraging arguments in the 
case law condemning ties).  
 302. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1958); Times-
Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609 (1953); Int’l Salt Co. v. 
United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (holding that a monopoly’s foreclosure 
of competition through tying arrangements may be per se unreasonable). 
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tion, which it viewed as a way of spreading monopoly vertical-
ly.303 
In fact, the leveraging theory never held a secure place in ei-
ther the writings of Harvard School economists and lawyers or in 
the S-C-P paradigm generally. When the writers representing the 
S-C-P paradigm spoke of tying, vertical integration, or other mo-
nopoly extensions, the stated concern was not the leveraging of 
additional profits but rather “foreclosure,”304 another concept that 
produced considerable controversy with the Chicago School but 
which nevertheless remains a much more viable topic of debate. 
For Bain, Kaysen, and Turner in the 1950s, and Areeda and 
Turner in the 1970s, the real concern that arose from the mono-
polist’s operations in a second market was that the firm would be 
able to deny market access to rivals.305 This view remains viable 
as a matter of legal policy to this day—for example, in the con-
demnation of Microsoft for tying Internet Explorer to its Windows 
operating system in order to deny market access to rival internet 
browser Netscape.306 
  CONCLUSION   
The Harvard School abandoned most parts of the S-C-P pa-
radigm in the 1970s, and since then Chicago and Harvard posi-
tions on competition policy have converged on most, but not all, 
issues. For example, Areeda and Turner completely accepted the 
Chicago School critique of the leverage theory in the first edition 
of their treatise on antitrust law.307 A further post-Chicago criti-
que has also emerged. Sometimes known as the new industrial 
economics,308 it uses the mathematics of marginalism and game 
theory in a highly technical fashion, in many cases far beyond the 
ability of any court to administer in the context of legal regula-
 
 303. See Robert Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal 
History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 157–58 (1954) 
(“[T]he recent attacks upon vertical integration are not something new in the 
law.”); Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 7–9 (explaining the development of legal 
policies aimed at vertical integration). 
 304. Cf. KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 243, at 157 (discussing tying and 
entry barriers). 
 305. See Turner, supra note 244, at 656. 
 306. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85–95 (D.C. Cir. 
2001); 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 245, ¶ 617 (examining the Micro-
soft issues). 
 307. Cf. 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 245, ¶ 347 (discussing tying and 
damages). 
 308. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 
333–36 (1988). 
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tion. One consequence is that while antitrust policy is far more 
sophisticated in its use of economics than it was a half century 
ago, the gap between high economic theory and antitrust practice 
is larger than it has ever been. 
The marginalist revolution completely revised our under-
standing of economic competition. Neoclassicism substituted a 
reasonably strong classical consensus with a complex variety of 
theories about how competition works. Along with this came an 
increasing belief that markets differ from one another much more 
than the classicists had believed. Accommodating these changes 
to competition policy has taken more than a century. In the 
process we have developed a set of complex antitrust rules and a 
corresponding awareness of the need for simplifying assump-
tions. While neoclassicism taught us that deviations from perfect 
competition are much more common than we once believed, it al-
so instilled a firm recognition that some deviations must simply 
be tolerated. 
 
 
 
